Historical Documentation of 1982 Killings of Dutch Journalists in El Salvador
On June 3, 2025, a court in rural El Salvador read the text of its historic verdict, for the first time holding high-ranking former military men accountable for the violence against civilians that characterized the country’s long and bloody armed conflict.[1] The case involved the March 1982 killings of Dutch journalists Koos Koster, Jan Kuiper, Hans ter Laag and Joop Willemsen, alongside four others presumed to be Salvadoran guerrillas, though their identities remain unknown. The court found that the men were killed in an ambush planned by Colonel Mario Adalberto Reyes Mena with knowledge of other military leaders, and sentenced retired Minister of Defense Colonel José Guillermo García, retired Colonel Francisco Morán, and retired Colonel Mario Adalberto Reyes Mena, to 15 years in prison. Further, the court ordered President Nayib Bukele, in his role as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, to issue a public apology to the victims’ families for the state’s role in delaying justice for decades.
This groundbreaking verdict comes in the midst of new and urgent concerns about violations of human rights in El Salvador, including widespread acts of repression against human rights defenders, including journalists. Several leaders have been arrested in recent months and are currently held as prisoners of conscience in El Salvador’s notorious prison system – the same system to which the United States government expelled hundreds of men, mostly Venezuelan nationals, in March 2025.
The violation of rights in El Salvador – then and now – is also inextricably linked to the role of the United States. During the war, the U.S. government served as a principal source of funding, training, and support for the Salvadoran military, which committed these crimes in the context of its counterinsurgency war against the FMLN guerrillas. Former Minister of Defense Guillermo García, in fact, based his assertion of innocence in the Dutch journalists case largely on the unequivocal support he claims to have received from the United States. However, University of Washington Center for Human Rights (UWCHR) Director Angelina Godoy’s analysis of U.S. documents about the killings, and about García’s communications with U.S. officials throughout the conflict, was actually part of the evidence cited by the court in convicting him under the doctrine of command responsibility. In fact, the historical documents paint a dramatically different picture than what García claims: they show that García was repeatedly reprimanded by U.S. officials for atrocities committed by troops under his command, some of which he admitted; and yet, he took no discernible action to seriously investigate past crimes or prevent their repetition.
For this reason, UWCHR is proud to share the below extracts from Dr. Godoy’s testimony, which draws on our Center’s 15 years of engagement with historical documents pertaining to the conflict in El Salvador. Documents referenced in footnotes can be found in an Appendix to this report, alongside Spanish-language translations.
Extracts from Dr. Godoy’s testimony in the Dutch journalists case, presented on December 16, 2024 to the Salvadoran Fiscalía General de la Nación (Prosecutor’s office):
U.S. Documentation of the War in El Salvador
Given the close relationship between the US and Salvadoran governments during the conflict, thousands of documents containing information relevant to the Salvadoran conflict remain in the US government’s possession; most remain classified or secret. Over the years, there have been several efforts to declassify these documents: two initiated by the US federal government in 1993 and 1994, and then a series of actions by private individuals under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
On behalf of the government, President Bill Clinton issued an executive order in 1993 that led to the declassification of 12,000 documents relevant to the cases investigated by the Truth Commission in El Salvador. Then, in 1994, a group of Republican Congressmen requested the declassification of a second, smaller collection of documents relevant to the abuses committed by the FMLN during the war. These documents are physically housed in the Library of Congress in Washington, DC, and in the National Archives outside the US capital. Some (but not all) of them have also been digitized and are available through certain libraries that can afford subscriptions to the company that digitized them.
In addition, over the years, several private researchers have filed more specific requests for information under the FOIA law, which in some cases have resulted in the declassification of other documents. In the case of these documents, although the document legally becomes “public,” the copy (whether physical or digital) is delivered to the person who requested it.
In the case of our investigations, since 2011, our academic research team has filed more than 790 requests for information on issues relevant to human rights during the conflict in El Salvador, to six major agencies[2] of the US federal government: Department of State (DOS); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Department of Defense (DOD); National Security Agency (NSA); and some subordinate agencies thereof. Through these requests, we have achieved the declassification of thousands of pages of documents relevant to human rights cases in El Salvador.
We have also filed four lawsuits against the federal government for failing to comply with the requirements of the FOIA in cases relevant to the armed conflict in El Salvador. These lawsuits before federal courts have been:
- University of Washington v. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2:15-cv-01577 JLR, filed in 2015, for access to information regarding Coronel Sigifredo Ochoa Pérez
- University of Washington v. Department of Defense (DOD) and its sub-agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 2:17-cv-01854 MJP, filed in 2017, for access to information regarding three military operations during the 1980s
- University of Washington v. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2:19-cv-00061 RAJ, filed in 2019, for access to documents regarding abuses by the National Police and Armed Forces
- University of Washington v. Department of Defense (DOD) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 2:23-cv-01107-RAJ, filed in 2023, for access to the archives of the Central American Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT)
In each of these cases, we have been successful in obtaining the release of classified documents relevant to the armed conflict in El Salvador. (The latest case is still before the federal courts, but as part of the negotiation between the parties, since May 2024 we have received a new batch of documents each month from the previously secret archive of the Central America Joint Intelligence Team.)
If the documents are delivered in a physical format, we keep them in our office; if delivered digitally, we also keep these copies, along with all correspondence that certifies them as authentic. Under U.S. regulations, what proves the authenticity of these documents is the “chain of custody” or correspondence with the state which attests to how our request for declassification was received and processed; there is no government entity responsible for “certifying” them as authentic, nor are seals or stamps affixed to them.
Once declassified, the documents are legally considered public, and there are no legal restrictions on their use, so copies are sometimes found posted on the internet for various reasons. Also in recent years, some government agencies have begun to publish part of their declassified documentation on their websites.
As a result of the aforementioned efforts, we currently maintain the largest repository of US government documentation on the conflict in El Salvador. Our collection includes documents of various kinds, including daily intelligence bulletins; analytical reports prepared based on months or years of information collected by military intelligence or security forces; and cables or telegrams between different parts of the US government.
These documents offer very important insights because they are contemporaneous with the abuses in question (not a story told much later), and in many cases because they were secret at the time of their preparation (that is, most were not prepared for public purposes, and therefore contain details that were not publicly revealed at the time). In several cases, this allows us to observe a difference between what was said publicly by the authorities—both Salvadoran and American—and what was known internally at the time of the events.
Interpreting these documents is a complex task because they compile information from multiple sources, written at multiple times, and for different purposes; sometimes, they contradict each other. Therefore, it is important not to seek to draw conclusions from reading a single document without understanding the entirety of these communications. But the documents can offer something unique and important when read in their entirety—that is, when the entire collection of documents is analyzed, not just a few loose pages, but the entire corpus of diplomatic, military, intelligence, and investigative correspondence on the events in question.
What the Documents Reveal About the Murders of the Dutch Journalists
I have identified 69 documents that I consider relevant to this case.
In addition to sharing the documents themselves, I offer an expert analysis of what is revealed when these documents are read in the context of the entirety of declassified documents on the conflict in El Salvador. I have divided this analysis into three chapters: the events of March 17, 1982; the context of the events; and the individual responsibilities of the defendants in this case. To support this analysis, I attach an Appendix containing copies of each cited document in its entirety, and a translation of the relevant portions for this particular case.
1) The Events of March 17, 1982
First, the declassified documents allow us to corroborate several elements of the case that have been reported by other sources, such as:
- the brief detention of Koos Koster by the Treasury Police on March 11;[3]
- the official version of the circumstances of his death;[4]
- the Dutch government’s questioning of that version;[5]
- and the tensions between the Salvadoran, US, and Dutch governments,[6] also reflected in the international press.[7]
Without a doubt, the most interesting document is the report from the US Embassy in San Salvador, sent to its superiors in Washington, which was not made public at the time. This document, SAN SA 02340, was sent very early in the morning on March 19, 1982 (in fact, it was still the night of the 18th in San Salvador)[8]; it summarizes the investigation conducted by the US Embassy immediately after being notified of the deaths on the morning of March 18. It is important because its content significantly departs from the public statements made by US officials; it should be read in its entirety[9].
To conduct the investigation, two Embassy officials went to the scene where they conducted an “examination of the bodies of the four journalists and the four guerrilla suspects, review of camera equipment and other possessions of the journalists, review of three weapons allegedly captured following the firefight, interviews with officers [at] the Atonal Battalion and soldiers involved in the combat, and a visit to the site where the firefight occurred.”[10] The two officials investigated the journalists’ activities in San Salvador. They concluded that the journalists’ deaths were caused by gunshot wounds received during an exchange of fire between an Atonal Battalion patrol and the guerrillas escorting the journalists—just as Salvadoran authorities claimed—but that “circumstantial evidence raises possibility that the journalists and guerrillas died in an ambush, rather than a chance encounter.”[11]
Along these lines, the report highlights several inconsistencies between the information independently gathered by its authors and the version of events recounted by the Salvadorans. For example, the U.S. advisors assigned to the El Paraíso barracks told Embassy investigators that the behavior they observed from the soldiers returning from patrol the previous night did not seem to indicate that they had been surprised by guerrilla fire. According to the report, “soldiers returning from patrol expressed elation at their success, referring to their mission as an ‘ambush.'” The report also mentions that “one [advisor] noted that the soldiers were approximately three km. beyond the normal patrol perimeter, and in a solidly guerrilla area. He also noted that such a patrol would rarely be out after dark.” The soldiers’ description of the shooting—a uniform description among all those interviewed, including the patrol’s commanding sergeant—also did not match the physical evidence the Americans found at the scene. The investigators “could find no evidence” that the guerrillas had fired as the Army reported: they found no evidence of grenades being used, and they found very few shell casings on the hills from which the soldiers reported the guerrillas had fired heavily. Given this observation, the soldiers appear to have argued that the guerrillas had stopped to collect all the shell casings before withdrawing from the battlefield. According to the document, “Events described varied with information gathered at the site of the encounter.”[12]
Despite these doubts about the official version of events, to date we have not found any declassified documents that suggest any subsequent investigations conducted by US officials. Rather, what we have is a sequence of many documents that show that the US government maintained a clear line first established hours after receiving the investigation report. On March 19, at a press conference that took place at noon (Washington time), the White House spokesman said, “Our Embassy’s inquiries into the incident did not produce any information which would contradict the government of El Salvador’s account that the four Dutch journalists were killed in a battle between guerrillas and Salvadoran Armed Forces near Paraiso on the evening of March 17.”[13] That is, the White House decided to adopt a position of “not contradicting”—which, it is worth noting, is not the same as “supporting” or “validating”—the Salvadoran government’s version, and they maintained that same carefully formulated line in the weeks and months that followed.[14]
2) The Context: A Long Campaign of Hostility Towards Independent Media
The attack on the four Dutch journalists was not an isolated event. Rather, it should be understood as part of a recognized pattern of attacks—physical and reputational—and attempts at intimidation against journalists in El Salvador, which by March 1982 was reaching its peak.
Following the deaths of the four Dutch journalists, the Committee to Protect Journalists wrote to U.S. Undersecretary of State Eagleburger, stating that the number of journalists killed in El Salvador in the past two years had now reached 26.[15] Some had lost their lives covering combat, but others had been intentionally killed, either by government forces or death squads. Some of these incidents are also reflected in the declassified documents; For example, a cable from the Embassy in July 1979[16] laments the fire that was set on the building of La Crónica, the only opposition newspaper, after threats were received by its editor, José Napoleón González; the following month, another cable notes that the threats against him continued.[17] In September 1980, another cable lamented a bomb attack on the YSAX radio station.[18] At the end of 1980, American journalist John Sullivan disappeared while reporting in El Salvador; his case was never resolved.[19]
Although each of these deaths is not recorded in U.S. documents, the atmosphere of terror experienced by the press at that time is. For example, a document written by Amb. Chapin on April 4, 1981, describes a series of incidents that “deepened the gloom and fear of the Camino Real-based press corps.” In one example, a team of CBS journalists were detained and threatened by the National Guard, who told the Salvadoran aide, “What are you doing, showing people things like this? You’re Salvadoran. We can make you disappear.” The cable also mentioned a recent COPREFA statement “threatening drastic measures” if the journalists continued to “distort the image of the Salvadoran government.”[20]
On April 6, 1981, the Embassy in San Salvador sent a copy of a death list to the State Department headquarters in Washington, with a note identifying it as a “communiqué issued by the armed forces press committee which identifies 138 individuals as traitors.”[21]
Although the copy of the original text included with the cable is quite illegible, the CIA referred to the list in another letter a few days later. Titled “El Salvador: Increasing Violence and Terrorism,” the CIA document states, “The high command… also is acquiescing in actions that will encourage extreme rightwing activities. It has, for example, recently issued an official declaration threatening foreign journalists who report unfavorably and published a list of ‘traitors’ that includes a number of civilian progressives.”[22] After the controversy sparked by the publication of the list, the Armed Forces issued a second statement insisting on the veracity of the accusations made in the first.[23]
If these 1981 documents describe an environment in which the Salvadoran government, through its state bodies—COPREFA and the High Command of the Armed Forces—already viewed the independent press as an enemy force, by early 1982 this declared enmity became even more bitter, because at the beginning of the year, the international reputation of the Salvadoran government was for the first time linked to the possibility of continued US assistance.[24] In this context, the first publication of the news of the El Mozote massacre, on the front page of the two most influential newspapers in the United States, coincided with the debates over the first certification, sparking speculation that journalists were seeking to undermine Washington’s relationship with San Salvador.
For example, in a cable sent to the Secretary of State in Washington dated March 10, 1982, Ambassador Hinton writes, “Post emphasizes that the torture story and the El Mozote report emerged in January shortly before the President’s certification for continued aid to El Salvador. There was certainly some truth to the El Mozote story, but timing of FDR/FMLN tour of area for correspondents was not in our view coincidental. We believe that in part both stories were calculated FDR/FMLN propaganda efforts to undermine the certification process.”[25]
Two days later, from Washington, the State Department sent a communication to all U.S. embassies around the world, specifically referencing recent coverage of El Salvador in the international press. It mentions “leftist of independently sponsored atrocity charges against the Salvadoran government without benefit of objective analysis or [counter-argument]. Several recent incidents which the press either distorted or ignored come to mind. The false New York Times article concerning the presence of American trainers at an Ilopango air base by torture session is a glaring example. It is complemented by the report of killings at El Mozote in which the guerilla version of events was not questioned by the press.” The aim is to share this analysis with other embassies to “set the record straight on the reported atrocities and provide an overview of the propaganda war raging round the El Salvador issue.”[26]
And while Washington was talking about a “propaganda war,” El Salvador was taking action. On March 17, an Embassy document describes the publication of a new death list circulated by a death squad. The communiqué contains the names of 35 journalists, including the Embassy’s press attaché, and denounces: “These are the ones responsible for the international discredit cause to our Armed Forces and the principle accomplices of Soviet-Cuban-Sandinista communism.”[27] Although the names of the Dutch journalists do not appear on the list, the fact that their murder occurred during those same days reflects a high level of hostility toward the international press on the part of the right wing in El Salvador. This hostility is explicitly expressed in this communiqué by a death squad, but also in the COPREFA communiqués and the actions taken by the Salvadoran High Command.
In this context, it is worth noting that in a conversation between Ambassador Hinton and Minister García on February 6, 1982, among other topics, a recent incident was mentioned in which the Army shot at some American video journalists, who fortunately escaped unharmed. The telegram does not go into details about what happened, but the Ambassador concludes, “once again Salvadorans appeared to lack control of troops.”[28]
3) Individual Responsibility of the Accused
In addition to confirming some facts related to the journalists’ deaths, the declassified U.S. documents may provide valuable information to consider when assessing the potential criminal responsibility of the individuals accused in the case: Francisco Morán, the Director of the Treasury Police at the time of the events; and Mario Adalberto Reyes Mena, the Commander of the Fourth Military Zone and first in command of the Fourth Infantry Brigade at that time;[29] and José Guillermo García Merino, the Minister of Defense.[30] Francisco Morán is accused of having provided the intelligence that led to the ambush operation; Reyes Mena is accused of having ordered the patrol to carry out the ambush; and Guillermo García is accused, under the doctrine of command responsibility, of having known about the systematic practice of political assassinations by troops under his command and of not having taken significant actions to prevent its repetition in this case.
In order to evaluate the evidence provided by the US documents regarding each of the accused, it is important to first establish how the intelligence institutions and the chain of command of the Salvadoran Armed Forces functioned during the early years of the war. According to US military and intelligence documents, command and control of the Salvadoran Armed Forces was centralized under the Minister of Defense during General José Guillermo García’s tenure. Departmental commanders received orders directly from and reported directly to Defense Minister García.[31][32] There were exceptions to this rule: in large-scale operations, the General Staff, rather than the departmental command, coordinated the operation.[33] In such cases, “task forces” of several battalions were formed, with a commander chosen by the General Staff, who would not necessarily be the commander of the department in question.[34]
But the operation that caused the deaths of the Dutch journalists was not large-scale: it was a patrol of just 25 men. And there are at least two declassified US documents that prove that, in the specific context of March 1982, the logic was different. The first, a document from the US Department of Defense Intelligence Agency dated February 4, 1982, explains, “Although large sweeps were planned in the area near Cerrón Grande and in Usulután, plans have reportedly been temporarily postponed because of the US Congress hearings and the desire to avoid negative press.”[35] In other words, at that precise moment, the military placed a higher priority on minimizing the possibility of negative press than on achieving victories on the battlefield.
The second document, from the Embassy in San Salvador, dated March 18, 1982, the day after the murders of the Dutch journalists, confirms: “During this period, so as to provide the necessary unity of command, departmental commanders would command all military and public security forces in their respective departments.”[36] From this, we can conclude that although the men in the patrol that killed the Dutch were from the Atonal BIRI, they received the order from departmental commander Reyes Mena, who reported directly to the Minister of Defense, Guillermo García. It is assumed that Reyes Mena received information about the journalists’ presence from another security force, since intelligence functions were highly decentralized at that time and information was shared informally. It would not be surprising if Francisco Morán passed on the information, since the fact that he arrested and personally interrogated Koos Koster days earlier indicates that he had him in his sights, but the declassified documents don’t provide further evidence of Morán’s possible role in the case.
On the other hand, the documents provide a wealth of information about José Guillermo García’s potential liability under the principle of command responsibility. In international criminal law, this principle holds that military commanders can be held criminally responsible for crimes committed by their subordinates if they knew or should have known about such crimes and failed to take action to prevent them. In García’s case, because crimes committed by the Armed Forces were a topic of open discussion at the time, it would be difficult to believe that he never knew about the abuses. However, the documents provide more direct evidence that he knew, because they abundantly mention conversations between US officials and García with the explicit purpose of calling him to attention for these abuses. While Salvadoran and US officials publicly denied or minimized evidence of massacres and other abuses, declassified documents allow us to see that behind closed doors, US officials often confronted their Salvadoran counterparts, demanding that they lower the level of repression and warning them that failure to do so would jeopardize US assistance.
Conversations with Minister García about abuses committed under his command
From August 1980 to February 1982, at least 19 private conversations are documented in which a series of US officials confronted García about abuses committed under his command. On several occasions, these were high-ranking officials, such as the Commander-in-Chief of US military forces throughout Latin America, General Nutting, or the US Secretary of State himself, Alexander Haig. For our purposes here, the most important conclusion is that, given such a series of conversations characterized by their participants as “straight” and “[blunt],”[37] it would not be credible for General García to claim ignorance of abuses under his command. Furthermore, in some of the conversations, the documents show that García confessed to knowledge of the abuses in question.
In the following pages, we share detailed information about these 19 conversations—summarized here in a table—regarding abuses committed by troops under Minister García’s command.
| No. | Date | Description | Abuses discussed | Source |
| 1 | Aug. 12, 1980 | In-person meeting with Ambassador White and a group of U.S. military advisors | Right-wing violence against civilians | 80 SAN SA 5810 (pp. 291-292 in Spanish/ 293-297 in English) |
| 2 | Nov. 27, 1980 | Telephone conversation with Amb. White | Detentions/ killings of FDR leaders | 80 SAN SA 08282 ( pp. 298 Spanish/ 299-300 English) |
| 3 | Dec. 1, 1980 | Two-and-a-half-hour in-person meeting with Ambassador White; García accompanied by four members of the JRG, the Deputy Minister of Defense, the Commander of the National Guard, and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. | Assassinations of FDR leaders | 80 SAN SA 08332 (pp. 301-302 Spanish/303-305 English) and 80 SAN SA 08421 (pp. 306-307 Spa/308-316 Eng) |
| 4 | Jul. 14, 1981 | With Amb. Hinton in person in San Salvador | Peasant massacre in Nueva Concepción | 81 SAN SA 05333 (p. 317 Spanish/ 318-320 English) |
| 5 | Sep. 3, 1981 | Secretary of State Alexander Haig orders Ambassador Deane Hinton to speak with García | Murders of American nuns and murders at the Sheraton Hotel | 81 STATE 235627(p. 321 Spanish/322 English) |
| 6 | Sep. 22, 1981 | In person with Ambassador Walters, Washington’s envoy to San Salvador | Murders of American nuns and murders at the Sheraton Hotel | Telegram number illegible; See “Ambassador Walter’s Visit to Salvador” (p. 323 Spanish/324 English) |
| 7 | Oct. 22, 1981 | With Amb. Hinton in San Salvador | Attack on civilians from a helicopter in Usulután | 81 SAN SA 08010 (p. 325 Spanish/326 English) |
| 8-12 | Week of Nov. 3-10, 1981 | In-person conversations in Washington, DC, with: – US Secretary of State and his team – US Senator Percy – US Congressional Representative Oakar – Bill Doherty of AIFLD |
Murders of American nuns and murders at the Sheraton Hotel | 81 STATE 304300 (pp. 327 Span./328-330 Eng.) |
| 13 | Nov. 9, 1981 | US Secretary of Defense and his team | Murders of American nuns and murders at the Sheraton Hotel | 81 STATE 304287 (pp. 331-332 Span/ 333-335 Eng) |
| 14 | Jan. 30, 1982 | With Amb. Hinton in person in San Salvador | El Mozote Massacre | SAN SA 00796
(p. 336 Spanish/ 337 English) |
| 15 | Feb. 2, 1982 | With Amb. Hinton in person in San Salvador | El Mozote and San Antonio Abad Massacres | 82 SAN SA 00825 (p. 338-339 Spanish /340-344 English) |
| 16 | Feb. 2, 1982 | Secretary of State Haig commands Amb. Hinton to tell García that he is “not welcome to visit the U.S. at this juncture.” | El Mozote and San Antonio Abad Massacres | STATE 026587 (p. 345 Spanish/346-347 English) |
| 17 | Feb. 6, 1982 | Two-hour conversation alone with Amb. Hinton in San Salvador | El Mozote and San Antonio Abad Massacres (also mentions attack on a team of American journalists) | STATE 034645 (p. 232 Spanish/ 350-352 English) |
| 18 | Feb. 17, 1982 | With the Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, Gen. Wallace Nutting, the second-in-command of the Embassy, DCM Bleakley, and the commander of the MILGP (US military group in El Salvador), in person | El Mozote and San Antonio Abad Massacres | SAN SA 01345 (p. 348-349 Spanish/350-352 English) |
| 19 | Feb. 19, 1982 | Three-and-a-half-hour meeting with three US Members of Congress, Harkin, Oberstar, and Coyne, in San Salvador | San Antonio Abad Massacre | San Antonio Abad SAN SA 01397 (p. 353-354 Span./ 355-365 Eng.) |
Below, I expand on some details of each discussion cited in the table. (Each paragraph is numbered with the conversation referenced in the table.)
1. In August 1980, the US government offered to lend the Armed Forces six helicopters free of charge, and to train their Salvadoran pilots, if the Salvadoran government took measures to curb right-wing violence. This document describes the meeting to propose this plan to “incentivize” the Revolutionary Government Junta to change, in which Defense Minister García opposed the idea of the US demanding conditions, describing it as an affront to his country’s dignity. The document describes his reaction: “[García] claimed that while the human rights goals in the U.S. document were good ones, Salvadoran “idiosyncrasies” were not being taken into account. (By “idiosyncracy,” García means that all abuses of authority by the military are handled quietly and “in house.”) He agreed that there have been abuses but didn’t think it a good idea to “proclaim” the fact. He seemed to think there was no point in it.”[38]
2. After receiving news of the arrest of the FDR leaders, then-Ambassador Robert White immediately called García, who said he would make inquiries; about 30 minutes later, García returned the call to report that no one from the security forces had participated. “I impressed on García the pressing need to locate these missing men and assure the world of their safety,” Ambassador White recounted in a cable, adding at the end: “There is no real doubt that members of the security forces have arrested the FDR leaders. It is my best guess, based on my conversation with Colonel García, that he had no advance knowledge of this operation, but, typically, the military is moving to protect its own, and a cover-up may be under way.”[39]
3. Although a death squad claimed responsibility for the assassinations of the FDR leaders, many documents on the case point to the conviction that there was official involvement, despite García’s denials. A few days later, Amb. White informed his superiors in Washington that President Duarte had privately admitted to him that the security forces were responsible for the six murders, and that he would meet the following day, December 1, with four members of the JRG, the Salvadoran Minister and Deputy Minister of Defense, and the Commander of the National Guard. The meeting took place on December 1 and is detailed in 80 SAN SA 08421, where Amb. White writes, “I told García that for decades every dictatorship in Latin America had insisted that the United States face up to the same dilemma: support us with all our flaws or let the communists win. I added that for the military to identify itself with right-wing repression would ensure the failure of the Salvadoran experiment. I emphasized to all present that unbridled violence was responsible for the plummeting international reputation of El Salvador and, unfortunately, the widely held opinion that some members of the security forces were involved was too often substantiated by convincing evidence reported here and abroad. I told the group that I regretted having to state these hard truths, but that it was essential that they control the security forces and not allow subordinates to take the law into their own hands. These lawless elements were a cancer that had to be cut out or it would eventually destroy the military. I closed by reminding García and the rest that while I shared his evaluation of the Cuban threat, I had to reject his assertion that we had not been concerned ourselves about violations of human rights in communist countries. I pointed out to him that, while we both agreed fully that the violent left in El Salvador was the ultimate enemy, the United States had always encouraged the Salvadoran military to confront the armed guerrillas with force, but to eliminate the disappearances, torture, and assassination carried out by death squads financed and run by the far right.”[40]
4. A State Department cable dated July 14, 1981, for example, recounts details of a conversation between Ambassador Deane Hinton and Defense Minister García, in which Hinton complained to him about “the massacre of 28 campestons near Nueva Concepción, which massacre had put El Salvador back on the front pages of the New York Times and the Washington Post. I told him that I was horrified by both the event and by its potential damaging effect for El Salvador.” According to the cable, García admitted the Armed Forces’ responsibility for the incident, saying, “Worst of all, it is true.”[41]
5. This cable, signed by Secretary of State Haig, titled “Churchwomen and Sheraton [Hotel] Murders,” explicitly instructs Ambassador Hinton to speak strongly with García: “We consider it essential that the suspects in both these cases remain under detention while the investigations continue, and you should continue to emphasize this point to Colonel García and other GOES officials in the strongest possible terms.”[42] There is no documented account of the conversation between Hinton and García in response to this order, but it is unlikely that Hinton disobeyed these instructions from the Secretary of State; it is more likely that any memorandum of the conversation has not yet been declassified.
6. The Reagan administration sent General Vernon Walters on a mission to El Salvador. Walters was then Ambassador-at-Large. The term “Ambassador at Large” refers to an ambassador not designated to represent the government in a specific foreign nation, but rather willing to travel on specific missions to wherever the Secretary of State sends them, to advance high-level U.S. interests. This cable written by the Embassy’s second-in-command, DCM Bleakley, summarizes the visit as follows: “Ambassador Walters, accompanied by Commander Martiny and DCM Bleakley, called on [the] Minister of Defense García at the Estado Mayor on September 22. The Ambassador enumerated for García the pressures in the U.S. to reduce violence against non-combatants in El Salvador and to pursue the investigations of the murders of American citizens….García left no question that he perceived the Salvadoran national interest at stake in these issues….”[43]
7. A cable from Hinton to Secretary of State Haig, dated October 22, 1981, mentions that the Ambassador spoke with Defense Minister García after U.S. officers aboard a helicopter piloted by Salvadoran soldiers reported seeing the Salvadoran soldiers open fire on unarmed civilians during the October operation in Usulután, during which the La Quesera massacre occurred. “I have talked straight, bluntly, and separately to Colonels Gutiérrez and García about [the] incident,” wrote Ambassador Hinton.[44] Later, in a November 7 cable, the Ambassador suggested his counterparts in Washington discuss the need to correct this lack of fire discipline during their face-to-face meetings with Minister García, who was then traveling to the U.S. capital.
8-12. After García’s week-long visit to Washington, DC, Under Secretary of State William P. Clark sent this cable to the Embassy in San Salvador, summarizing the discussions held in Washington. “García was pressed hard in separate meetings with the Secretary, Department of Defense officials, Senator Percy, Representative Oakar, other members of Congress, and Bill Doherty [to] pursue more vigorously the churchwomen’s and agrarian reform workers’ murder investigations and crack down on official violence. We cannot judge [the] effect on García. He generally responded with formulations [the] embassy has heard before,” Clark wrote.[45]
13. This cable, also written by Under Secretary of State Clark, elaborates on the meetings held at the Department of Defense on November 9: “The subject of reference (Security Force Excesses) was discussed with Minister of Defense García and other members of his party on several occasions during his visit to Washington, both in State and Defense. The subject also surfaced at press conferences and during his meetings on Capitol Hill. The Minister is, therefore, well aware of the sensitivity concerning this matter…Secretary Carlucci followed up on this point by saying that the Reagan administration desired to continue to provide as much assistance to El Salvador as possible, but as García could now understand, congressional support is essential. U.S. public opinion and congressional opinion has been negatively influenced by accounts of excesses committed by the security forces. Carlucci added that the Department of Defense’s ability to generate congressional support would be facilitated if we could state that we have the personal assurance of the Minister of Defense that every effort will be made and steps taken by the Armed Forces to control these excesses. 6. García replied by reiterating that he understands the seriousness and concern, and assured Deputy Secretary Carlucci that he would do all in his power to control [the] excesses by the security forces. 7. Comment: We concur in your view that blunt talk by a senior U.S. general may be worthwhile in continuing to keep pressure on the Salvadorans to control these excesses. We understand that Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci believes that Lieutenant General Nutting could well serve this purpose by direct in-country access to Minister of Defense García and the Salvadoran military.”[46]
14. This document, sent from Ambassador Hinton in San Salvador to his superiors in Washington, relates the following: “Defense Minister García is on his way to [the United] States to attend, among other things, a Congressional prayer breakfast. In [a] talk [on] January 30 on [the] margin of dinner, we discussed: (a) Morazán massacre allegations, (b) Army attack on house where [an] American lived, (c) CESPDES attack on Jesuits, and (d) latest thinking on the nuns’ murder case. I warned García to be ready to respond to the Morazán massacre story. He was his usual cocky self, ‘I’ll deny it and prove it fabricated.’ I wished him well and added he would have to explain away details provided by correspondents. It might be possible – we were investigating and were grateful for his help – but he should bear in mind that something had gone wrong. Who did it, when, and in what circumstances was something else… I told García that “I did not like the raid conducted the night before on a house where an American was living.” He replied, “We are looking into it.” For good measure, I suggested to García that it was time he got CESPDES under control, since its latest attack on the Jesuits was totally irresponsible.”[47]
15. In this cable, Hinton reports another conversation in which he again asked García for an explanation about what happened at El Mozote. García said the news was “a ‘novela,’ pure Marxist propaganda devoid of foundation,” but Hinton insisted that he needed information about who had been involved in the operation. Hinton also mentioned the San Antonio Abad massacre [where internal Embassy reports concluded that the Salvadoran government’s version did not fit]. Hinton asked him “once again to exhort his commander to more rigorous control over their forces.” In a comment at the end of the cable, Hinton summarized the inconsistencies he had noticed between García’s explanation and the other evidence.[48]
16. The full content of this cable, sent from the Secretary of State in Washington to Ambassador Hinton in San Salvador, is as follows: “2. You should convey to General Garcia that he is not welcome, [I repeat] not welcome, to visit the United States at this juncture. His presence can only add to an already acrimonious debate which has been fueled by reporting of massacres in Morazán, and more recently [on] the night of January 30/31 in San Antonio Abad. At a time when we are trying to convince Congress of the urgency of further military assistance for El Salvador after the attack on [the] Ilopango air base, it would be inappropriate for the Minister of Defense to be seen in the U.S. absent from his post of duty. 3. You may pass all of the above to General Garcia. 4. (If, and only if, necessary to hold him, tell Garcia above is message from Secretary Haig.)”[49]
17. This telegram, written by Amb. Hinton, summarizing a private conversation with General García, says the following: “Guillermo García, Salvadoran Minister of Defense and Public Security, may have lousy intelligence about guerrilla operations, but he had an uncanny sense of our concerns. At a long lunch at residence [on] February 6, he skillfully opened with a neat speech about how he and his forces had to do better in controlling excesses, while promoting elections without involving [the] Army in partisan politics. Thereafter for two hours we talked alone about these and related themes. He is the very model of a modern politically astute general, at least in private conversation, with a knack for pre-empting my lines. Maybe he had an advance copy of [the] script, but not at least from me. García made many commitments in [the] course of this conversation (we’ll see how many of them and how they are fulfilled.) [The] following account of conversation, which flowed backwards and forward is rearranged in part by subject: elections, political outlook, violence and army discipline, D’Aubuisson and [the] “Argentine solution,” public opinion and Congress, need to go on the offensive, the war, intelligence, attack on the U.S. TV crew; the Armed Forces Information Service (COPREFA); 506(a) assistance and priorities; threat to U.S. personnel at the Sheraton; Nicaragua. End summary.…6. Violence and Army Discipline. I agreed in general with García’s view of media distortion, but in discussion of cases hit hard on [the] need both for good product to sell and for better salesmanship. [The] good product part of the equation means no more massacres, no more San Antonio Abads. I added, for good measure, [the] need to take firm, quick [and] public disciplinary action if, despite all efforts, abuses occurred. He agreed with [the] first point, but seemed uneasy with [the] idea of disciplinary action. I agreed [that] good officers were in short supply and that disciplinary action might be misunderstood and resented by other officers, who would credit discipline with only trying to do their duty as he saw it to eliminate subversives. He intimated [that] San Antonio Abad may have been a set-up, but said [the] First Brigate had over-reacted. Whereas last week he defended [the] operation, this time he acknowledged errors had been made. Still, [the] major in command was [an] outstanding officer who was needed. [The] investigation is proceeding, and it is too early for him to draw conclusions. (Nothing much will happen here, I imagine, but maybe, maybe, maybe next time.)”[50]
18. In a detailed summary of this meeting, Ambassador Hinton recounts that at first, and in front of everyone, García maintained the same line as in previous conversations, that the stories of a massacre at San Antonio Abad were pure propaganda. But then DCM Bleakley asked to speak with García privately and made it clear that this account was simply not credible, prompting a confession from García. The document states, “2. Defense Minister García met for an hour February 17 with General Nutting [Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command], accompanied by [the] DCM [second-in-command of the Embassy, Bleakley] and MILGRP commander [group of U.S. military personnel in El Salvador]. While the discussion dealt primarily with military matters, General García also talked about alleged excesses of the armed forces in much the same terms as had led to his explosive confrontation with Senator Leahy [on] February 13 (as we mentioned in the previous telegram). He said ‘Reports on Mozote and San Antonio Abad are nothing more than a leftist propaganda campaign. Of course, there are fire fights in which people are killed and the media exploits these bloody scenes by photographing the bodies of those killed in these fire fights.’ 3. Following the meeting, DCM asked to see García alone. He explained to the [Minister of Defense] that he had just come from a meeting with Congressmen Harkin and Oberstar, who made it quite clear that in their meeting with General García, scheduled for February 18, they would bring up specifically El Mozote and San Antonio Abad. With regard to San Antonio Abad, DCM pointed out that the COPREFA story about an armed fire fight just did not wash. The American people and these Congressmen had seen graphic pictures of the bodies with bullet wounds in their heads and powder burns indicating execution at close range. Some of the bodies showed signs of torture, many were in their underwear, and many had their hands tied behind their [backs]. An Embassy officer had confirmed all of this personally. There had been many witnesses who, while they may have exaggerated, independently told almost exactly the same story to reporters and to our official only shortly after the event. 4. Garcia replied by saying, ‘You are right, the Armed Forces are guilty. I have investigated it and now I don’t know what to do about it. The officer in charge must be punished, but if we turn him over for trial, I fear the reaction from the troops and other officials. We can not take the internal pressure. This is the same problem we face time and time again. I don’t know what to do about it. I have avoided talking in public about San Antonio Abad, but I know that Mr. Enders and Secretary Haig could not avoid it. They had to go before the American Congress and attempt to defend us when we really couldn’t be defended. I can understand why the opposition turns against us. I recognize how great the danger is that we will lose the whole thing.’ (i.e., U.S. assistance).”[51]
19. In February 1982, a delegation of Congressmen, led by Senator Tom Harkin, accompanied by Representatives Jim Oberstar and James Coyne, visited El Salvador. This document, a telegram drafted by the Embassy’s press attaché, offers a transcript of (part of) a press question-and-answer session with the Congressmen. In their comments, the Congressmen describe a three-and-a-half-hour meeting with General García where they questioned him pointedly about El Mozote and San Antonio Abad. They accused García of denying the facts and covering up the massacre (despite SAN SA 01345 [Appendix pp. 348-349/350-352] documenting that García had privately admitted, two days earlier, the culpability of the Armed Forces for the massacre).[52]
The central argument supported by these details of the 19 conversations is that it would be impossible for General García to be unaware of the frequency and severity of abuses committed under his command after having to answer so repeatedly to officials at the highest levels of the United States government (including, for example, after being informed by the U.S. Secretary of State that he was not welcome to visit the country). From this, we can conclude that he was aware of the abuses and move on to assess what he did to stop them.
Actions taken by General García to stop the above-mentioned abuses
There are many examples of promises offered by García at those same meetings, but little evidence that he followed through on those promises after the meeting. If we trace the measures taken case by case after the commitments to take concrete action in the cases cited above, we see very few results.
Assassinations of the Six FDR Leaders:
Following up on the discussions regarding the assassination of the FDR leaders and right-wing violence in general under the JRG, the results are mixed. In a telegram dated November 27, 1980, Amb. White acknowledged some progress, mentioning that on October 15, 1980, the Salvadoran government issued a formal declaration of its commitment to controlling human rights violations and that García helped promulgate a policy of seeking to capture guerrillas alive, rather than executing them: “The Minister of Defense added a directive to the recently completed plan to protect the harvest, ordering that as many guerrillas as possible be captured alive. American officers have been present during briefings to subordinates in which the Minister has stressed this point.” However, the same statement details the unfulfilled commitments of the Minister (and the government in general): “Little has been done regarding [the] identification of problem areas and [the] transfer of personnel, and absolutely nothing has been done regarding a specific commitment to move against those responsible for rightist violence.”[53] The case remains in impunity.
Murders of the 4 American nuns and 2 Americans at the Sheraton Hotel:
The same applies to the follow-up on the commitments made in meetings about the murders of the American nuns. In a letter, to which Ambassador White responded in an unnumbered letter dated December 8, 1980,[54] García promised to investigate the murders of the American nuns and bring them to justice. This was fulfilled with the arrest of suspects in May 1981,[55] but the fulfillment was partial because the masterminds were never investigated or prosecuted.
The same thing happened with the murders of advisors Pearlman and Hammer at the Sheraton Hotel. Although two perpetrators, both National Guard members, were found guilty of the crime, both confessed to having committed the crime under orders from their superiors,[56] but there was no investigation into the National Guard officers involved. There are numerous U.S. documents that attest to the very limited military cooperation in the investigation of the crime; to give just one example, in SAN SA 08721, for example, Ambassador White concludes that “The security forces are withholding information or demonstrating very vague memories of events. They are not giving full cooperation to the investigation.” The same is emphasized in a January 16, 1981, cable, which concludes, “In fact, the dilatory investigations into the deaths of the four churchwomen and now the land reform advisors suggest strongly that the Salvadoran Armed Forces are still not willing to get tough with those who carry out the [murder] orders…”[57]
Massacre of peasants in Nueva Concepción:
There is no document mentioning an investigation into those responsible, much less any actions taken to bring those responsible to justice or enact reformed policies that would prevent a recurrence of the crime, although García privately acknowledged that the allegations of abuse were true.
Attack on civilians from a helicopter in Usulután:
There is no evidence of an investigation or punishment of those responsible, nor of the adoption of new policies.
El Mozote Massacre:
This is the most infamous case of all. There is no evidence of an investigation or punishment of the perpetrators, nor of the adoption of new policies to prevent its recurrence, under García’s tenure at the head of the Ministry of Defense. Moreover, internal US correspondence often accuses García of actively obstructing investigation efforts. For example, in a February 1, 1982, cable, Ambassador Hinton comments that García’s assertions that he had no information about military actions at El Mozote struck him as “stonewalling without credibility. I have tried to warn him re [that he] needs to face up to [the] problem, but my impression is he thinks categorical denial is [the] way to handle [the] question.”[58] In another cable to Washington, Hinton writes, “I warned García to be ready to respond to [the] Morazán massacre story. He was his usual cocky self, ‘I’ll deny it and prove it fabricated.’”[59]
San Antonio Abad Massacre:
In a private conversation with Ambassador Hinton on February 6, 1982, García said the case was under investigation. Still, Hinton sensed it was going nowhere: in the summary of the conversation, Hinton wrote, “Whereas last week he defended [the] operation [at San Antonio Abad], this time he acknowledged errors had been made. Still, [the] major in command was an outstanding officer who was needed. [The] investigation is proceeding, and it is too early for him to draw conclusions. (Nothing much will happen here, I imagine, but maybe, maybe, maybe next time.)”[60] This is the only mention of an investigation in the declassified documents. I found no mention of the results of such an investigation. Rather, even after admitting that mistakes had been made and mentioning the alleged investigation, he continued to tell other US officials that the news of the massacre was false, part of “a leftist propaganda campaign.”[61]
It is possible that Minister García took steps to curb the abuses under his command that are not reflected in the declassified documents (either because US officials were unaware of such actions at the time, or because the documents in which they are mentioned remain secret today). However, this is unlikely, because there was considerable interest on the part of the US government in soliciting, gathering, and disseminating positive information about the efforts of its Salvadoran allies to curb the violence. It is unlikely that García would have taken steps without mentioning them to the Americans who consistently questioned him about the issue; and it is even less likely that, if the information were available, the US government would have kept it secret.
Rather, throughout his tenure as Minister of Defense, the declassified documents portray García as someone who understood his primary mission as defeating the left by any means necessary. He is quoted on multiple occasions as commenting that curbing the Army’s abuses is undesirable because attempting to do so would be equivalent to handing the country over to communism. For example, in December 1980, the CIA reported, “Most military officers were highly pleased with the assassination of the six FDR leaders. These officers believe that other leaders and members of the FDR should be eliminated in a similar fashion whenever possible. These feelings were expressed by several middle-level Army officers on 28 November 1980 in the presence of Colonel José García Merino, Minister of Defense, and Nicolás Carranza, Sub-Minister of Defense, and both García and Carranza indicated that they supported this line of thinking. From the comments of all those present during this conversation, it was clear that García, Carranza, and the other officers present accepted as a fact that the military services were responsible for the assassination of the six FDR leaders.”[62]
In 1982, the CIA concluded, “Except in certain visible and publicized cases, García has not used his influence to address the issue of the excesses committed by the extreme right in El Salvador. In this regard, he is representative of the mainstream officer corps, whose primary concern is the destruction of the insurgency. He accepts the grim reality that some innocent people will be harmed in the attempt to attain that goal.”[63]
Conclusion
Based on the information provided by declassified US government documents to date, the following can be concluded:
Regarding the events of March 17, 1982
The only U.S. effort to clarify the circumstances of the deaths of the four Dutch journalists was the investigation conducted on March 18, 1982. The investigation report was written by John McKay, then the defense attaché at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador, and sent to Washington that same night by Ambassador Hinton. The investigation concluded that several elements of the official version of events offered by the Salvadoran government did not match the information investigators had gathered the day after the events. However, a few hours after receiving the report in the early hours of the 19th, the White House decided to tell the press that the U.S. government had “uncovered no information to contradict the official version of the GOES [Government of El Salvador],”[64] a phrase carefully crafted in English and repeated until the case disappeared from the headlines.
Regarding the context
The deaths of the Dutch journalists occurred during a period of fervent hostility toward the independent press in El Salvador. This is not only reflected in the number of murders of journalists or the open statements made by the Armed Forces against the press; it is also reflected in the language used by officials of both governments (US and Salvadoran) to describe the press as a threat to the public image of the Salvadoran government. At that time, the public image of the Salvadoran regime was extremely important because in the US, the legal requirement that military assistance to El Salvador be subject to a prior certification process before Congress had just been introduced. In this context, the news of the El Mozote massacre, reported until the end of January 1982, had proved extremely inconvenient, so much so that in February/March 1982, the US government told Minister García that he was not welcome in the country, and the Armed Forces themselves decided to limit military offensives so as not to risk receiving unfavorable coverage during the hearings before the US Congress.
Regarding the individual responsibilities of the defendants in this case
The declassified documents provide little about Francisco Morán‘s involvement in this case, other than that he was the one who initially interrogated Koos Koster on March 11, although there is abundant US documentation regarding his involvement in other crimes.
Regarding Mario Adalberto Reyes Mena, the documents help us understand his role as commander of the Fourth Military Zone, and the fact that the patrol that killed the journalists would have left the barracks under his command.
Regarding José Guillermo García, the documents establish that, as Minister of Defense at that time, he was ultimately responsible for all military actions. It is more than evident that he knew about the abuses committed by his subordinates; he even admitted it at times to US officials. However, the actions he took to investigate the events, punish those responsible, and prevent the crime from recurring were extremely few, half-hearted, and ineffective.
It is regrettable that so many years have passed without Salvadoran society being able to come closer to the truth of what happened in this case, in order to assess the historical responsibility of these people and others. I hope that this analysis contributes something useful to this process of clarification and democratization.
NOTES
[1] The verdict was first announced on June 3, 2025, with its text to be made public a month later. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/04/world/americas/el-salvador-killings-dutch-journalists-1982.html
[2] In the United States, the term “agency” or “department” is used to refer to various departments of the executive branch of government.
[3] See the official document signed by Koster and Morán on March 11, 1982 (page 2 of the Appendix) and the internal U.S. Embassy memorandum written that same day regarding that detention, which includes a telephone conversation with the Dutch consul and an in-person visit by two Embassy officials to the Alameda Hotel where the journalists were staying, where the journalists told the officials that they considered their brief detention/interrogation “case closed.” (See “Detention of Journalists,” by Tomchik, page 3 of the Appendix, translated into Spanish, pp. 4-5 in the original English version.)
[4] It was first communicated to Ambassador Hinton on the morning of March 18 by General Gutiérrez (see SAN SA cable 02311 (see p. 6 of the Appendix translated into Spanish/pp. 7-8 in the original English), and then reaffirmed in the COPREFA communiqué that same day (See STATE 76294, pp. 9-10 of the Appendix translated into Spanish/pp. 11-13 in English), and repeated in the CIA daily intelligence report on March 22 (see p. 14 of the Appendix translated into Spanish/pp. 15-20 in the original English) and repeated by President Duarte before the press (see STATE 078127 (see p. 21-23 of the Appendix for the Spanish version/pp. 24-28 for the original English version) and in another unnumbered CIA intelligence report dated March 9). April 1982 (see pp. 29-32 of the Appendix in Spanish/pp. 33-36 in English).
[5] HAGUE 2246 (pp. 37-38 in Spanish/pp. 39-42 in English); also see UN report E/CN.4/1983/20 (an excerpt translated into Spanish on p. 43/pp. 44-96 for the full version).
[6] THE HA 02174 (See p. 97 in Spanish/pp. 98-99 in English), THE HA 02186 (p. 100 in Spanish/pp. 101-102 in English), STATE 075948 (p. 103 in Spanish/pp. 104-105 in English), MOSCOW 3420 (p. 106 in Spanish/p. 107 in English), THE HA 02300 (p. 108 in Spanish/p. 109 in English), THE HA 02354 (p. 111 in Spanish/pp. 112-114 in English), SAN SA 02524 (p. 115 in Spanish/p. 116 in English), THE HA 02434 (p. 117-119 in Spanish/pp. 120-124 in English), THE HA 02697 (p. 125 in Spanish/p. 120-124 in English), THE HA 03148 (p. 128 in Spanish/p. 129-120 in English), STATE 148012 (p. 131 in Spanish/p. 132 in English), SAN SA 04564 (p. 133 in Spanish/p. 134 in English).
[7] THE HA 02176 (pp. 135-137 in Spanish/pp. 138-139 in English), THE HA 02268 (pp. 140 in Spanish/pp. 141-142 in English), STATE 078127 (pp. 143-145 in Spanish/pp. 146-150 in English).
[8] The cable indicates the time it was sent using “Zulu time” or Greenwich Mean Time (English) standard; on SAN SA 02340 the notation is “0555Z,” which means 5:50 a.m. in Greenwich, which would have been 12:55 a.m. Washington time during that time of year. Zulu time is 5 hours behind Washington during the time of year when Daylight Savings is observed in the U.S., and 4 hours behind the rest of the year; Daylight Savings begins on the second Sunday in March, which was March 13 in 1982. The time difference between San Salvador and Zulu time is 6 hours, which means this document was sent at 11:55 p.m. San Salvador time on March 18.
[9] It can be found on pages 151-153 (Spanish translated version) and 154-156 (English original) of the Appendix.
[10] See SAN SA 02340 (pages 151-153 translated into Spanish, or pages 154-156 in the original English).
[11] See SAN SA 02340 (pages 151-153 translated into Spanish, or pages 154-156 in the original English).
[12] See SAN SA 02340 (pages 151-153 translated into Spanish, or pages 154-156 in the original English).
[13] See STATE 074013 (pages 157-158 in Spanish, or pp. 159-161 in English).
[14] For example, on May 7, 1982, SAN SA 03876 (p. 162 in Spanish/p. 163-164 in English) reports that an American journalist working for ABC reported to the Embassy’s second-in-command that he had obtained a copy of an FMLN video in which a supposed witness to the ambush in which the four Dutchmen were killed was interviewed. The witness claims they were murdered. According to the document written by Amb. Hinton, DCM Bleakley warned him not to be swayed by the accounts of a single witness months after the events, and that the U.S. government “had uncovered no information to contradict the official version of the [Salvadoran government]”, again using the same phrase.
[15] See Letter from the Committee for the Protection of Journalists, pp. 165-166/167-168 of the Appendix.
[16] See 79 SAN SA 05431: “The burning of the opposition newspaper ‘La Crónica del Pueblo’: During late evening of July 14, arsonists set fire to “La Crónica” plant. Secretariat of Information of Office of President Romero and other newspapers condemned act and Ambassador sent letter of condolence to publisher Dr. José Napoleón González. González had received threats previously and in letter that appeared in July 13 “La Crónica” had denied that newspaper was “organ” of leftist Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR). “La Crónica” reappeared in a smaller, weekly edition on July 23 with Archbishop Romero among others offering help to put paper back on daily basis. Burning of “La Crónica” was particularly significant since it was only daily Salvadoran newspaper that would take ads from and report news on opposition groups as well as report on allegations of human rights violations that normally do not appear in San Salvador’s other conservative newspapers.” (See page 169 of the Appendix in Spanish/pages 170-179 in English).
[17] See 79 SAN SA 04662: “On June 6, explosive device containing pamphlets went off in garage area of home of José Napoleón González, editor of “La Crónica del Pueblo” and Secretary General of Salvadoran Commission on Human Rights. Pamphlets threatened González, who also claimed to have received other threats (including phone calls).” (p. 180 of the Appendix in Spanish/pp. 181-190 in English).
[18] See 80 SAN SA 06715 (p. 191 translated into Spanish/p. 192-194 in its original version).
[19] See “El Salvador: Performance on Certification Issues – Summary,” unnumbered, July 27, 1982 (pp. 195 in Spanish/196-203 in the original English).
[20] See SAN SA 02566 (p. 204 in Spanish/205-207 in English).
[21] See 81 SAN SA 0258 (p. 208 in Spanish/209-211 in English).
[22] See “El Salvador: Increasing Violence and Terrorism,” unnumbered (p. 212 in Spanish/213 in English).
[23] See 81 San Salvador 02536 (p. 214 in Spanish/215 in English).
[24] In late December 1981, the US Congress, reacting specifically to repeated reports of human rights violations committed by the Salvadoran government, passed a new law, Section 728 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act, which required the US government to “certify” the progress of its Salvadoran counterpart every 180 days. Failure to certify would prevent El Salvador from receiving US funding.
[25] See SAN SA 02012 (pp. 216-217 in Spanish/218-220 in English).
[26] See STATE 066018 (pp. 221-222 in Spanish/223-225 in English).
[27] See SAN SA 02329 (pp. 226-227 in Spanish/228-231 in English).
[28] See p. 7 of document STATE 034645 (SAN SA 1039): “Incident where U.S. TV crew was fired upon but justified it in terms of orders to troops to defend Cuscutlan railroad bridge. I told him TV crew’s side of story. We agreed it lucky no one was hurt. I pointed out that once again Salvadorans appeared to lack control of troops.” (p. 232 in Spanish/233-240 in English).
[29] As noted in his biographical file from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (see Reyes Mena Biographical File, p. 241 in Spanish/242-244 in English), Reyes Mena held that position until November 1982, when he transferred to the Second Brigade. As described in the September 1982 Army Intelligence Survey, “The Fourth Military Zone consists of the Departments of Chalatenango and Cabanas [sic] …The Fourth Infantry Brigade is the zone command as well as the departmental command for Chalatenango and is headquartered at El Paraiso. This brigade has five rifle companies and a communications section totalling 800 personnel. Military Detachment I, headquartered in Chalatenango, patrols that department with the Fourth Infantry Brigade; it is, however, considered equivalent to a department command and reports to the Armed Forces General Staff.” (pp 36-38 of Army Intelligence Survey ATC-GI-2660-079-83 1 VOL III, September 1983).
[30] See the biographical profile of José Guillermo García Merino prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (p. 245 in Spanish/246 in English).
[31] See, for example, the DIA analysis from July 1982: “Departmental commanders… report directly to the Minister of Defense. Officers designated as one of the 14 departmental commanders are the most important field commanders and their additional titles as brigade, military detachment, or battalion commanders are meaningless except as an administrative accounting device. With the departmental commanders reporting directly to the MOD and receiving orders from him, the Chief of Staff, and the General Staff agencies under him, function only in administrative and planning roles to support MOD decisions.” (See “Background Paper: El Salvador,” p. 247 of the Appendix for an excerpt in Spanish, or pp. 248-251 for the entire document in its original English.)
[32] In fact, this decentralization of command caused much frustration to American advisors; there is extensive American documentation discussing this problem and its consequences for the war. To cite just two examples: in July 1982, a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst commented, “The military leadership and the MOD, in particular, have been working very hard to bring all elements of the regular forces under centralized control. This has meant that the traditional autonomy of departmental commanders had to be severely restricted. In past, the departmental commanders had the direct responsibility for all security matters in their department and could exercise a great deal of individual judgment because their orders or directives were very general.” (See “Background Paper: El Salvador,” pp. 247 in Spanish/248-251 in English). A second example, from an August 1982 document written by the embassy’s second-in-command, DCM Bleakley: “A major shortcoming lies between headquarters [sic] and the six Brigade Commanders. The Brigade Commanders plan and execute operations often without precognizance by the High Command. This failure has created [sic] situations where the High Command must attempt to ‘catch up’ to the operations in terms of tactical support, logistics, and intelligence. The propensity for the Brigade Commanders to take unilateral action that ultimately impacts elsewhere has resulted in poorly planned, executed, and supported operations, has directly contributed to increased combat casualties and equipment losses, and provided the insurgent with a psychological and propaganda advantage.” (See SAN SA 06485, p. 252 for an excerpt translated into Spanish, or the entire document in its original English on pp. 253-276.)
[33] According to the Chief of Staff, Col. Flores Lima, who told the press on May 17, 1982, “Each military commander has the authority to organize and control his respective zone and that only large-scale operations were coordinated by the General Staff.” DIA, May 21, 1982, “Press Conference. Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff.” (See page 277 of the Appendix in Spanish/278 in English.)
[34] The National Strategic Plan prepared by General Woerner (American) describes this process as follows: “Due to the fact that battalions can seldom mount an operation with more than one company, a task force is organized, under the direction of the Armed Force General Staff, to conduct larger scale operations. The task force is generally built upon the organic units of the commander responsible for the area of operations. The organic units are augmented as necessary by company elements of the Quick Reaction Battalion or companies from other battalions throughout the country which are not committed and can be spared.” (p. 84).
[35] See DIA DIN 35-48 “DIA Intelligence Notice: El Salvador: Situation Report” February 4, 1982 (Appendix
- 279 in Spanish/280-282 in English).
[36] See SAN SA 02327 (Appendix p. 283 in Spanish/284-290 in English).
[37] See page 326 of the Appendix.
[38] See SAN SA 5810 in the Appendix, pp. 291-292 in Spanish or 293-297 in English.
[39] See SAN SA 08282 in the Appendix, p. 298 in Spanish or 299-300 in English.
[40] See SAN SA 08421, pp. 306-307 (in Spanish) or 308-316 (in English) of the Appendix.
[41] See SAN SA 05333, page 317 of the Appendix in Spanish or pages 318-320 in English.
[42] See STATE 235627, page 321 of the Annex in Spanish, or page 322 in English.
[43] See “U.S. Ambassador Walters Visit to Salvador,” p. 323 (in Spanish) or 324 (in English) of the Appendix.
[44] See SAN SA 08010, page 325 of the Appendix in Spanish, or page 326 in English.
[45] See STATE 304300, page 327 of the Appendix in Spanish, or pages 328-330 in English.
[46] See STATE 304287, pp. 331-332/333-335 of the Appendix.
[47] See SAN SA 00796, page 336/337 of the Appendix..
[48] See SAN SA 00825, pp. 338-339/340-344 of the Appendix.
[49] See STATE 026587, pp. 345/346-347 of the Appendix.
[50] See STATE 034645, p. 232/233-240 of the Appendix.
[51] See SAN SA 01345, pp. 348-349/350-352 of the Appendix.
[52] See SAN SA 01397, pp. 353-354/355-356 of the Appendix.
[53] See SAN SA 08281, pp. 366-367/368-373 of the Appendix.
[54] See “Letter from White to García” (Appendix, p. 374/375-376).
[55] See SAN SA 03525 (Appendix, p. 377/378).
[56] See “Statement on AIFLD,” (Appendix, p. 379/380-395).
[57] See 81 SAN SA 0340 (Appendix, p. 396/397-400).
[58] See SAN SA 00797 (Appendix, pages 401/402-403).
[59] See SAN SA 00796 (Appendix, page 336/337).
[60] See STATE 034645 (Appendix, p. 232/233-240).
[61] See SAN SA 01345 (Appendix pages 348-349/350-352).
[62] See “Satisfaction of Many Military Officers with Assassination of Leaders of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR); Belief that the same Tactics Should be Used to Eliminate Other Leftist Leaders” (Appendix, p. 404/406-406).
[63] See García’s biographical file (Appendix, page 245/246).