SECRET

19 JAN 1984

100

2433

CAS 5/8/97

ATC-GI-2660-079-83, VOL III

0142

North

Army Intelligence Survey

EL SALVADOR

VOLUME III - ARMED FORCES (U)

SEPTEMBER 1983

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS CENTER

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

045 518/97

PUBLICATION NUMBER ATC-GI-2660-079-83, VOL III
TASK NUMBER. . L-9033X-ES

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS CENTER

ARMY INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
EL SALVADOR

VOLUME III - ARMED FORCES (U)

Publication Date; September 1983
Information Cutoff Date; September 1982

Author; John F. Hornbeck

NOTE: The reverse side of this page is blank.

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS CENTER
ARLINGTON HALL STATION
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22212

IAX-Z

7 AUG 1983

SUBJECT: Army Intelligence Survey - El Salvador, Volume III, Armed Forces (U), ATC-GI-2660-079-83

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY ON: ORIGINATING AGENCY'S DETERMINATION REQUIRED

NOTE: The reverse side of this page is blank.

FIRST IN INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET~~

PREFACE (U)
(This preface is UNCLASSIFIED.)

(U) The Army Intelligence Survey (AIS) is a series of volumes that provides intelligence information on a selected country. It is a compilation of separate volumes of finished intelligence designed to support tactical commanders or contingency planners and useful both for real-world situations and tactical training.

(U) Volume I, Country Resume, provides a general overview of the country and includes topics such as geography, history and culture, population, government, economy, and public security forces. Volume II, Military Geography, addresses in greater detail topics concerning climate, natural terrain, military considerations, transportation, telecommunications, strategic areas, resources, and industrial facilities. Volume III, Armed Forces, provides intelligence on the background, structure, and doctrine of the country's armed forces. In some instances, such as for larger countries, this volume is published in two separate parts: Part One - Handbook of Ground Forces, and Part Two - Ground Forces Order of Battle. Volume IV, Counterintelligence, addresses topics such as internal security, foreign intelligence collection, and military ground forces intelligence. Volume V, Medical Intelligence, is produced and disseminated by the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) under the title "Military Medical Capabilities Study." It addresses environmental health factors contributing to health, sanitary engineering, fauna and flora of medical importance, disease, public health services, military medical services, medical facilities, medical personnel and training, and medical materiel. Volume VI, Psychological Operations, is produced and disseminated by the 4th Psychological Operations Group and provides psychological profile information on the country's military forces. It addresses military political involvement, psychological operations capabilities and limitations, and the armed forces as a psychological operations target.

(U) Volume III - El Salvador was prepared for the United States Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center under an interagency agreement. This document has been coordinated within the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). It has also been formally coordinated with major US Army commands and numerous government agencies. Interpretation of intelligence information in this publication represents the views of INSCOM and may be subject to modification in the light of subsequent information.

(U) Address all comments to Commander, US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, ATTN: IAX-I-QC, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia 22212. Requests for copies of this document, or for changes in distribution requirements, should be addressed to Commander, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, ATTN: IAIESC-R, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia 22212.

NOTE: The reverse side of this page is blank.

~~SECRET~~ CAS 5/8/97

CONTENTS (U)
(This list is UNCLASSIFIED.)

~~SECRET~~

CONTENTS (Continued) (U)
(This list is UNCLASSIFIED.)

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (U)
(This list is UNCLASSIFIED.)

FIGURES

TABLES

NOTE: The reverse side of this page is blank.

SECRET

SECRET

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (U)
(This list is UNCLASSIFIED.)

AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery
AFGS	Armed Forces General Staff
ANTEL	National Telecommunications Administration (Administracion Nacional de Telecomunicaciones)
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
D-I	Personnel section of the General Staff
D-II	Intelligence section of the General Staff
D-III	Operations section of the General Staff
D-IV	Logistics section of the General Staff
D-V	Civic Affairs section of the General Staff
DEM	Diploma of the General Staff (Diplomado del Estado Mayor)
FAS	Salvadoran Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Salvadorena)
FAH	Honduran Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Hondurena)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FOTELSYS	Foreign Telecommunications Systems
HF/SSB	High frequency single sideband
hp	horsepower
IIR	Intelligence Information Report
JRG	Revolutionary Junta of Government (Junta Revolucionario de Gobierno)
km	kilometer
kn	knot
lb	pound
m	meter
MAP	Military Assistance Program
mm	millimeter
MIS	Military Intelligence Summary
MOD	Minister of Defense
MTT	Military Training Team
NDB	Non-directional radio beacon
nm	nautical mile
PB	Patrol boat
PBR	River/Roadstead Patrol boat
PC	Patrol craft
S-1	Personnel section of the National Guard
S-2	Intelligence section of the National Guard
S-3	Operations section of the National Guard
S-4	Logistics section of the National Guard
S-5	Public Relations section of the National Guard
SOUTHCOM	US Southern Command
SSB	Single Sideband
VOR	Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range

LIST OF PLACE-NAMES (U)
(This list is UNCLASSIFIED.)

Place-Name	Geographic Coordinates
Acajutla	1336N08950W
Ahuachapan	1355N08951W
Bahia de Jiquilisco	1310N08828W
Chalatenango	1403N08856W
Cojutepeque	1343N08856W
El Paraiso	1407N08904W
El Salvador International Airport	1326N08903W
El Zapote	1340N08911W
Gulf of Fonseca	1310N08740W
La Libertad	1329N08919W
La Union	1320N08751W
Puerto El Triunfo	1317N08833W
San Francisco Gotera	1342N08806W
San Juan Opico	1353N08922W
San Miguel	1329N08811W
San Salvador	1342N08912W
San Vicente	1338N08849W
Santa Ana	1359N08934W
Santa Tecla	1341N08917W
Sensuntepeque	1352N08838W
Sitio del Nino	1348N08922W
Sonsonate	1343N08944W
Suchitoto	1356N08902W
Usulutan	1321N08827W
Zacatecoluca	1330N08852W

NOTE: The reverse side of this page is blank.



JULY 1982

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Area of Interest Map — El Salvador

SECRET

SECRET CAS 5/8/97



UNCLASSIFIED

(U) National Flag of El Salvador



UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Land Area Comparison Map

NOTE: The reverse side of this page is blank.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ CNS 5/8/97

~~SECRET~~

REDACTED

REDACTED

ICTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

ACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

ICTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

ICTED

REDACTED

(C) The Salvadoran air force is headquartered at Ilopango Airfield, and consists of 800 personnel including 43 pilots. Its 89 aircraft are all based at Ilopango, including the new UH-1H helicopters received from the US in 1982 (see Figure 15). Responsible for internal security and national defense, the air force is utilized primarily in a ground support role, although reconnaissance missions are also conducted. The air force suffers from major deficiencies in logistics, maintenance, and communications and many of its aging aircraft are militarily inferior to those of neighboring Honduras and Nicaragua. Interdiction efforts have been minimally successful; unidentified aircraft continue to operate in Salvadoran air space.

(C) Paramilitary forces include the Treasury Police (1,600), National Police (2,900), and the National Guard (4,500). The National Guard is considered the best ground force in El Salvador and works in conjunction with other public security forces in maintaining peace. All paramilitary forces are headquartered in San Salvador, although personnel are deployed throughout the country.

(C) There is also a nationwide municipal security force known as the Territorial Service. This volunteer force, which has no funds for uniforms or weapons, numbers approximately 80,000.

2. History (U)

(U) The armed forces have always played a prominent role in Salvadoran history, both politically and militarily. Military power has consistently been the route to political power in El Salvador and military leaders have frequently been the country's major political force.

(U) El Salvador was part of the Captaincy General of Guatemala during the colonial period. It did not maintain its own standing army, but contributed to the regional military force. A volunteer Salvadoran army briefly existed in the late eighteenth century and was primarily concerned with controlling various pirate groups. At independence, in 1821, each Central American country was maintaining its own army.

(U) The first constitutionally created Salvadoran army was established in 1824 under General Manuel Arce. This army assumed the role as El Salvador's primary military force with the disintegration of the Central American Federation in 1838.

(U) The Salvadoran army increased in size during the nineteenth century. Considerable influence was exercised by a number of foreign countries, especially France and Chile in the nineteenth century, and Germany and the US in the twentieth century. The Salvadoran Military Academy was established in 1867, and except for the period 1891-1900, it has functioned without interruption. Chilean influence continued through 1957, with four separate missions sent to El Salvador to develop military training programs. They were responsible for establishing the Command and General Staff School as well as a training program for noncommissioned officers.

(U) The National Guard was created in 1912 with the assistance of the Spanish military and has become an effective and well trained force. Foreign influence continued after World War II with increasing interest and aid focused on the area by the United States. Military material and training in counterguerrilla warfare, as well as in naval and air force operations continue to be a major part of US military aid to El Salvador.

(U) In 1969, El Salvador's regional military power was demonstrated during the Soccer War with Honduras. Salvadoran troops advanced close to the Honduran capital and air strikes destroyed much of the Honduran air force on the ground. Salvadoran military power has been largely eroded in the last ten years as neighboring Central American countries, with the exception of Costa Rica, have upgraded and enlarged their own military forces. (For further discussion of Salvadoran foreign policy, see AIS-El Salvador, Volume I, Chapter 4.)

(U) The military has essentially controlled Salvadoran politics for much of the twentieth century. Military rule, although constitutionally prohibited, has been continually justified by a paternalistic view of the armed forces duty to protect the country.

3. Mission (U)

(U) The Salvadoran Constitution of 1962 establishes the armed forces to "protect the integrity of the territory and the sovereignty of the republic, enforce the law, maintain public order, and guarantee constitutional rights." The armed forces is also directed to ensure that the principle prohibiting presidential self-succession is upheld. Military service is compulsory and the armed forces were created to be a nonpolitical and "obedient entity."

(U) With the growth of domestic unrest and violence, internal security has become the primary mission of the armed forces. External threats are now perceived as secondary to the immediate insurgent situation.

(U) Certain constitutional guarantees were suspended by a series of decrees enacted by the Legislative Assembly in the late 1970s. These decrees were intended to allow the armed forces sufficient flexibility to effectively deal with internal unrest.

4. National Level Organization (U)

(C) Until the elections of March 1982, the Salvadoran Armed Forces were directed by the Revolutionary Junta of Government (JRG), as were all civilian activities. The Junta consisted of one army officer, Gen. Jaime Abdul Gutierrez, one independent, Dr. Jose Ramon Avalos Navarrate, and two Christian Democrats, Dr. Jose Antonio Morales Ehrlich and Jose Napoleon Duarte Fuentes. Duarte was president of the Junta.

(U) The election of Alvaro Alfredo Magana Borjo as interim president altered the command structure of the armed forces. This necessitated the resignation of Gutierrez from his post, effectively consolidating all military control under Gen. Jose Guillermo Garcia Merino. Colonel Rafael Flores Lima is Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff. (For information on key military personalities, see AIS-El Salvador, Volume I, Chapter 6.)

(U) The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff oversee a defense establishment that is composed of two major components: the armed forces and the public security forces. The armed forces include the army, navy, and air force. Paramilitary forces include the National Guard, National Police, Treasury Police, and Territorial Service (see Table 1).

Table 1. (U) National Level Military Organization



~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Although the president is officially the commander of the armed forces, final military control is exercised by Garcia, the Minister of Defense and Public Security. The military hierarchy is planning to create the position of Commanding General or Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to oversee the day-to-day operations of the military. The occupant of this post would report to the Minister of Defense (MOD), thus freeing the MOD to concentrate on political-military affairs at the cabinet level.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The General Staff is organized into five sections responsible for Personnel (D-I), Intelligence (D-II), Operations (D-III), Logistics (D-IV), and Civic Affairs (D-V). The D-V section, responsible for public works and health activities, actually conducts counterintelligence activities in support of counterinsurgency operations. The D-V section is slated for eventual elimination.

~~(S)~~ Operations, D-III, is the most important general staff organization because of the insurgent situation. It is, however, understaffed and ineffective in attempting to coordinate activities of the armed forces. Coordination among ground forces has proven to be unattainable. Disastrous operations have occurred where small units are introduced into areas of strong resistance in a piecemeal fashion. Once deployed, poor logistics and communications compound operations problems. US assistance has generated some progress in coordinating the military forces; however, glaring deficiencies still hamper operations.

~~(C)~~ The ground forces are deployed among six military zones each of which is assigned one or more battalions. All tactical commanders report directly to the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces General Staff. General Garcia and Colonel Flores coordinate and direct all military operations. The Minister of Defense makes all final decisions affecting the deployment of military forces.

(U) Security forces are basically paramilitary organizations. Although technically established as constabulary forces, they have increasingly become involved in counterguerrilla operations. The National Guard acts as a rural police force responsible for public security, law, and order; the National Police functions as their urban counterpart. Treasury Police monitor customs activities and are assigned to ports, airports, and border areas. They are usually accompanied by National Guardsmen. The Territorial Service is a volunteer organization responsible for local defense and security.

(U) The navy and air force are theoretically autonomous services of the armed forces, equal in status with the army. Both services are headquartered in San Salvador and their commanders are directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense. Political and military power, however, remain largely in the hands of the army.

5. Logistics (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ The armed forces logistical system is coordinated by the Ministry of Defense, utilizing the Armed Forces Arsenal, the National Maintenance Shop, and the Central Supply Facility, all of which are located in San Salvador. This highly centralized system presents problems in the resupply of field commands, particularly those commands situated in peripheral areas of the country. Guerrilla forces are often in control of certain portions of the highway system necessitating the shipment of materiel under heavy guard.

~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)~~ The heterogeneous weapons inventory and poor management further hinder an effective resupply system. To eliminate the inventory problem, the armed forces are attempting to procure weapons from a single source, preferably the United States. Old and poorly maintained vehicles limit logistic mobility.

~~(S)~~ Logistical planning for operations is insufficient. In most cases, logistical support is not provided in anticipation of conflict, but rather in response to guerrilla operations. (For a discussion of Salvadoran industrial facilities, see AIS-El Salvador, Volume II, Chapter 8.)

---

6. Foreign Aid/Sales (U)

(U) El Salvador is dependent upon foreign sources for arms, ammunition, equipment, and military training. Europe had been the primary source of arms until World War II. Europe then required arms for its own war effort, and the US established military and supply relationships with much of Latin America. Fidel Castro's assumption of power in Cuba shifted US policy focus from hemispheric defense to a concern for internal security and political stability within individual countries. This concern is especially evident in El Salvador. Arms transfers in the 1950s and 1960s, under the US Military Assistance Program (MAP), however, were largely restricted to World War II and Korean War surplus. In the 1970s, US military assistance to El Salvador was restricted due to massive human rights violations. Restrictions on the quality and quantity of military equipment prompted El Salvador to seek military assistance from Europe and other arms-supplying countries. Purchases of aircraft, tanks, armored cars, and conventional small arms from Great Britain, France, Israel, and in some cases, other Latin American countries displaced the US as the primary source of arms.

(U) The diversity of arms suppliers is largely responsible for two major problems: the heterogeneous nature of El Salvador's weapons inventory and the need for specialized training. As weapons became more sophisticated, the necessity for technical training programs increased. As the logistics system developed there were problems with the supply of spare parts and ammunition, especially in times of war and domestic unrest.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ Major arms suppliers in recent years have been the US, Israel, France, Germany, and Yugoslavia, with weapons transfers ranging from small arms to jet aircraft.

a. United States (U)

(U) US foreign policy decisions have again involved the US in the military assistance arena. It is widely believed that US assistance is an absolute necessity if the Salvadoran Armed Forces is to deal effectively with the insurgency. US training missions have been one element in a comprehensive training program which includes specialized in-country instruction from both regular and special US forces. Additionally, 1,600 Salvadoran soldiers were sent to two US training facilities for four months in 1982 for basic instruction in combat infantry techniques. Officers and NCOs preceded the regular soldiers to complete a one-month training program in military leadership. The US has trained three immediate reaction battalions: the Atlacatl, the Atonal, and the Ramon Belloso. These forces were immediately utilized in both training and combat roles upon their return to El Salvador.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The training of officer candidates included lectures on civilian-military relations, handling of prisoners, and traditional training in standard military operations. In the field, these trainees were considered cadet lieutenants and were integrated into the armed forces as platoon leaders. This integration aided in filling a critical void created by the lack of junior officers and professional non-commissioned officers.

(U) Arms transfers have also increased with the shipment of six UH-1H helicopters in February 1982 to replace those damaged or destroyed during a guerrilla attack at the Ilopango Military Airfield. These aircraft are critical for ground support, reconnaissance, and evacuation operations.

b. Israel (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ Israel has been an important arms supplier to El Salvador in recent years. In 1975, an $8 million arms package included 18 Ouragan jet fighters, four Fouga Magister jet trainers, four Arava STOL transports, aircraft spare parts, rockets, bombs, and assorted infantry weapons. Pilot training began in 1976 when four Salvadoran air force personnel were sent to Israel, and four Israeli technicians were sent to El Salvador.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ In 1978, El Salvador purchased 100 Shafrir air-to-air missiles for $2.4 million. An unknown number of Israeli specialists in counterinsurgency operations and weapons maintenance may have been sent to El Salvador in 1981.

c. France (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ France has been an important source of aircraft. In 1975, one Alouette III and three SA-315 Lama helicopters were purchased for $1 million. In 1979, a $5.7 million sale involved two SA-315 helicopters, five Rallye Socata 235 aircraft, and three CM-170 Fouga Magister jet trainers. Twelve AML-90 Panhard Armored Cars were also purchased in 1979. Training for pilots of Alouette III and Lama helicopters was provided in France.

d. Federal Republic of Germany (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has consistently supplied small arms and ammunition. Other FRG sales to El Salvador have included armored personnel carriers (APC) and trucks. Six UNIMOG 1½-ton trucks and 30 ¼-ton VW 181 trucks were sold to El Salvador in 1970. Ten UR-416 APCs were sold in 1971 and 20 more UNIMOG were sold in 1979.

e. Yugoslavia (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ Yugoslavia has been the only Eastern European supplier of military equipment. The most recent sale, in 1970, included 36 20 mm antiaircraft guns, and one hundred 120 mm and 81 mm mortars. Ammunition accompanied the sale of mortars.

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 2. (U) A UNIMOG UR-416 APC in La Union

7. Communications (U)

~~(S)~~ Army, navy, air force, and national guard units are linked by a nationwide high frequency single sideband (HF/SSB) fixed radio network. The navy and air force also operate internal communications networks. Ilopango Airfield is equipped with a commercial landline to the Armed Forces General Staff Headquarters. Plans to install a Motorola 72-channel microwave radio-relay system have been delayed due to domestic disagreement over control of the system. Both the Army Signal Corps and the civilian telecommunications agency, ANTEL, claim jurisdiction over operation and management of the system. (See also AIS-El Salvador, Volume II, Chapter 6.)

8. Personnel and Training (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Salvadoran Armed Forces has an elaborate training program for officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted personnel. There are numerous service schools under the direction of the Adjutant General of the Ministry of Defense. There is also some undefined administrative input from the Personnel Section (D-I) of the Armed Forces General Staff. Each service also provides additional specialized training programs, but the army is directly responsible for the majority of military schools. Literacy and trade skills are taught at the unit level, with specialized training limited to those who reenlist.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ There is a critical shortage of officers and qualified NCOs. Many officers were purged during the 15 October 1979 coup, with battle casualties accounting for losses of field officers and NCOs. This has had an impact on overall military capabilities, with little expectation for improvement in the near future. The training of officer cadets in the US has partially remedied this situation. A number of military schools have shortened or eliminated training programs in order to place more enlisted men and officers into field positions where they are needed for counterinsurgency operations.



UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 3. (U) Signal Corps Training Class

a. Personnel (U)

~~(C)~~ Salvadoran law requires that all eligible men register for the draft upon reaching their eighteenth birthday. Length of service is 18 months. Although a formal conscription system exists, most inductees are rounded up by the Army in rural areas and are sent to the nearest battalion-level training facility. This practice has left the army open to infiltration by guerrilla sympathizers. The conscription process, with its emphasis on rural roundups, tends to induct men drawn from the lower and uneducated sectors of society, hindering training. No women have been drafted.

b. Officer Training (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The military education system is designed to provide basic and advanced officer instruction. This is accomplished through two complementary types of

curricula. The first focuses on enhanced combat capabilities; the second is aimed at developing advanced technical specialists.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Career officer training is a continuous process, with advancement in rank accompanying the completion of instruction. Each level of officer training, from the Military Academy, through the Arms and Services School, to the Command and General Staff School, is increasingly selective. Additional advanced training in strictly military subjects takes place at the Armed Forces Studies Center (Centro de Estudio de la Fuerza Armada) which specializes in career development and joint operations.

c. Enlisted Training (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Numerous schools are utilized in training recruits and draftees. Formalized enlisted training has been sharply curtailed in recent years, however, due to the widespread insurgency and the need for soldiers to fill units.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Recruit Instruction Center (Centro de Instruccion de Recultas de la Fuerza Armada) at Sonsonate offered basic training in close order drill, weapons handling, and general military discipline in an eight to ten week course. The Center has, however, been closed, with all basic training reverting to the battalions.

d. Specialized Training (U)

(U) Officer and enlisted personnel receive specialized training at a number of facilities.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Airborne Training School (Escuela de Paracaidistas), founded in 1973, is located on Ilopango Airfield. It trains army and air force officers and enlisted personnel in basic parachuting, rigging techniques, free fall, and advanced parachuting (Jumpmasters School).

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Commando Instruction Center, organized in 1976, trained officer and enlisted personnel in small unit tactics. Located in San Francisco Gotera, ten instructors trained an average class of 100 in patrolling, map reading, survival, and hand-to-hand combat. The school has been closed due to the guerrilla war and transformed into an infantry unit responsible for the defense of Morazan.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Engineer Instruction Center at Zacatecoluca has also been closed and converted to a straight infantry unit responsible for patrolling and defending the Department of La Paz.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Signal Instruction Center is located in San Salvador and responsible for training officers and enlisted men in communications. Basic communications operations and other technical communications subjects are offered.

e. Foreign Training (U)

~~(C)~~ Foreign military training has always constituted a major part of the instructional program within the armed forces. Training has been provided by the US, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela.

(1) United States (U)

(C) In addition to the assignment of US Military Training Teams (MTT) to El Salvador, the US has provided training for 1,600 Salvadorans at US military bases. This constitutes a policy change for the Salvadoran military as it has generally been considered too costly in terms of manpower to send troops to foreign countries for training.

(C) A contingent of 490 Salvadoran military personnel, destined to become officers in the army were trained for 14 weeks in lieu of four years at the military academy. These graduates are classified as "officer aspirants" and considered junior officers with a rank between sergeant and lieutenant.

(2) Chile (U)

(C) Chilean influence in Salvadoran military schools has been evident for decades and continues to play an important role. Coursework on national security policy, taught by a Chilean Officer, deals primarily with geopolitical and strategic subjects. The Chilean Government has also offered technical assistance in the form of scholarships for study in Chile.

(3) Argentina (U)

(U) Argentina provided intelligence training in 1980-81 for up to 10 Salvadoran officers. Specific topics included organization, infiltration, and interrogation techniques.

(4) Colombia (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Colombia has also offered intelligence training to a select number of Salvadoran officers. Billets have been set aside for the course in light cavalry, although large numbers of personnel cannot be accommodated.

(5) Venezuela (U)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ A Venezuelan military training team initiated a commando course in El Salvador in June 1982. The 35-day course was developed to instruct a 300-man battalion in intelligence, handling of POWs, map reading, explosives and sabotage, field combat actions, maintenance, communications, and weapons.

9. Paramilitary (U)

(U) The Paramilitary forces of El Salvador consist of three public security forces: the National Guard (Guardia Nacional), the National Police (Policia Nacional), and the Treasury Police (Policia de Hacienda). All three are directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and are headquartered in San Salvador with field units deployed throughout the country. These forces are responsible for both constabulary and counterinsurgency operations.

(C) There is also a nationwide municipal security force known as the Territorial Service.

a. National Guard (U)

~~(C)~~ The National Guard was created in 1912 by Spanish officers who modeled the organization after the Spanish Civil Guard. It functions as a rural police force throughout the country, with regional commands at department capitals. As of December 1981, the National Guard had 4,500 personnel.

~~(C)~~ The National Guard is organized into five regional commands composed of 14 subordinate companies. The first command is headquartered in San Salvador and is responsible for the Departments of La Libertad, Chalatenango, and San Salvador. The second command, responsible for Santa Ana, Ahuachapan, and Sonsonate Departments, is headquartered in Santa Ana. The third command is headquartered in Cojutepeque and is responsible for Cuscatlan and Cabanas Departments. The fourth command is headquartered in San Vicente, with responsibility for the Departments of San Vicente, La Paz and Usulutan. The fifth command operates from San Miguel and is also responsible for the Departments of San Miguel, La Union, and Morazan.

(U) Commanded by an active army officer, there are staff positions responsible for Personnel (S-1), Intelligence (S-2), Operations (S-3), Logistics (S-4), and Public Relations (S-5). Each regional commander reports to the Director of the National Guard.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Guard is generally considered an elite service, and the most proficient ground force in the country. It is better trained than the regular army and its

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 4. (U) National Guard Troops

personnel have more experience in the field than the infantry. It is, however, still considered primarily a constabulary force, and engages guerrillas only when necessary. Guerrilla activities have forced the National Guard to consolidate its forces in certain areas, leaving parts of the country without adequate security forces.

(U) Personnel are usually volunteers from the regular army who are induced to join because of higher pay and the elite status of the Guard. In recent years, however, volunteers have been hesitant to join as the Guard is often the first target of the guerrillas. This shortage of volunteers has forced the Guard to accept conscripts. The one-year special course required for entry into the National Guard has been reduced, further eroding the Guard's capabilities. Human rights abuses by the Guard further detract from the National Guard's ability to attract volunteers and meet professional standards.

b. National Police (U)

(U) The National Police was formed in 1945 as the urban counterpart of the National Guard, with responsibility for maintaining law and order, protecting life and property, preventing crime, and apprehending offenders. The National Police has also been integrated into the counterinsurgency effort, although it plays a smaller role than that of the army and the National Guard. Increased urban warfare and sabotage have forced the National Police to search entire blocks of houses at a time, using light armored tanks as support.

(U) The National Police, with 2,900 personnel, is organized into three sections: the general, investigative, and traffic police. The general police are the uniformed street patrolmen. Investigative police include plainclothed detectives and crime laboratory technicians. The traffic police regulate vehicle traffic in the larger urban areas. Urban fire departments are also subordinate to the National Police.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Recruits with previous military experience are preferred over inductees, although recruiting from the military has become virtually impossible in recent years. Recruiting was discontinued in March 1982 due to a lack of weapons with which to arm inductees. The continued weapons shortage has caused morale to drop significantly. New officers receive six months training at the National Police Academy in Santa Tecla. The National Police is considered the least dependable and most corrupt security force in the country, especially at the officer level.

c. Treasury Police (U)

(U) Organized in 1926, the Treasury Police is a constabulary group responsible for customs duties and the interdiction of contraband. Headquartered in San Salvador, most officers are located at airports, seaports, and border crossings. Treasury Police are usually unarmed and they are often accompanied by a National Guardsman. The Treasury Police has 1,600 personnel.

(U) Treasury Police operations have been expanded in recent years to interior areas of the country, and have assumed a more traditional police role. Treasury Police are now stationed in both urban and rural areas. Although the smallest of the security forces, it is often the most aggressive, a fact which has led to abuses of power and violations of human rights.

d. Territorial Service (U)

(~~C/NOFORN~~) Formed in the 1920s, the Territorial Service, referred to as "Patrulleros" or "Escoltas," is a volunteer reserve force working at the canton or municipal level. This group is represented at the national level by a commandant who reports to the Minister of Defense. At the local level, each group reports to the departmental military commander.

(~~C/NOFORN~~) The Territorial Service is primarily responsible for local defense or security, although it also works in intelligence operations at the department level, reporting to the department's S-2. In the past, its members have proven to be excellent sources of information regarding local occurrences and guerrilla operations. As they are subordinate to a military commander, they are often ordered to accompany army troops on security missions such as protecting electrical plants or crops. The degree to which these forces are utilized in both intelligence and military operations depends upon the particular departmental commander.

(U) The Territorial Service is a voluntary organization with no funds provided for uniforms or weapons. Members are often armed with nothing more than their own machetes, unless they are working in conjunction with a regular military unit. Territorial Service personnel are also subject to conscription.

(U) The Service suffers from some of the same problems encountered by the rest of the Salvadoran armed forces. Most notably, they have been accused of violent treatment of local civilians causing deterioration of military-civilian relations. The members are local residents and usually known within their communities. For this reason they are regular targets for guerrillas and their sympathizers. While exact personnel strength is unknown, there are an estimated 80,000 members nationwide.

10. Intelligence (U)

(~~S~~) Salvadoran military intelligence is insufficent at all levels. Major deficiencies in the intelligence system account for the seriously inadequate collection and dissemination of information relative to guerrilla activities, greatly undermining operational readiness.

(~~S~~) Intelligence at the General Staff level is directed by a D-II officer, responsible for coordinating battalion-level (S-2) information with the National Intelligence Service, although actual coordination among intelligence groups is minimal. Improved tactical intelligence is essential, and while attempts to coordinate S-2 and D-II resources since 1979 have been substantial, the results are insufficient to properly deal with the guerrilla threat.

(~~C/NOFORN~~) The ruling Junta had no effective control over intelligence activities at any level. The Minister of Defense, General Jose Guillermo Garcia, was at one time commander of the D-II, although this position is now held by a lower-ranking officer. The civilian members of the Junta took no part in controlling intelligence activities, and were themselves possible targets of military intelligence operations.

(~~C/NOFORN~~) The D-II section of the General Staff is the major coordinating arm of the intelligence community, designed to support the Operations Section of the General Staff. The D-II receives information from field units (S-2) of the Army, National Guard,

National Police, Territorial Service, and Treasury Police. As of March 1982, the D-II office assigned one additional intelligence officer to any brigade conducting a large operation in order to improve field intelligence. The air force and navy have no viable intelligence capabilities. Finished reports are produced and sent to the General Staff and appropriate field commands. National level analysis, conducted at the D-II level, is often little more than repetition of field reports.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The D-V (Civic Action) is a cover operation for the collection of political and economic intelligence and is functioning as a counterintelligence organization. This function includes monitoring and disseminating information regarding leftist revolutionary groups. It has also been reported that the D-V may report on the Christian Democratic Party as well as various groups within the armed forces. The D-V reportedly has responsibility for a psychological operations (PSYOP)/propaganda program which has not yet been fully implemented. Staff size is approximately 20 to 30, with the majority being civilians.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The role of the investigative branches of the public security forces has been changed from criminal investigation to intelligence gathering. In some cases they are more valuable than the army S-2 sections; although the timely dissemination of information is a major problem with the paramilitary groups as well as with the army.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Personnel shortages have severely restricted S-2 capabilities at the brigade and battalion levels. Staff officers perform a variety of duties, including intelligence work; there are no officers responsible for intelligence on a full-time basis.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Data collected in the field originates from three sources: casual informants, developed network informants, and captured insurgents and documents. Casual informants irregularly pass on information of varying importance, while network informants operate under the control of S-2 officers. Captured insurgents are interrogated at the company and sometimes the battalion level, but are rarely detained for interrogation at the general staff level. Interrogation techniques are unsophisticated; typically, little information is obtained. Captured documents are usually sent to the General Staff for analysis.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Joint Operations Center of the Salvadoran Armed Forces was established in November 1980 and is staffed primarily by D-II personnel. It functions primarily as a warning center, and integrates and summarizes intelligence information, including aerial photographs and radio intercepts.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The General Staff has apparently decided to establish a national interrogation center. It will be located at Sitio del Nino and will report to the D-II.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The first Tactical Intelligence Course was conducted with US assistance in November and December 1981 and graduated 22 personnel. The course is scheduled to graduate 100-125 students annually with each prepared to perform duties at the S-2 level. Advanced training in interrogation techniques and counterintelligence will be incorporated into the program at a future date. The second course began 25 May 1982 and utilized those graduates of the first course and four MTT personnel to instruct officers from all services of the armed forces. The purpose of this course is to establish a tactical intelligence school as well as expand the number of personnel qualified to work in intelligence. Imagery interpretation was added to the second course.

(S/NOFORN) 

(~~C~~/NOFORN) Salvadoran military intelligence coordinates radio direction finding and wiretapping with the National Telecommunications Administration (Administracion Nacional de Telecomunicaciones — ANTEL).

(~~S~~/NOFORN) There are numerous weaknesses in the intelligence services. There is no single agency that effectively coordinates all intelligence activities, and little management of the collection, dissemination, and production of information. Significant resources are used in the gathering of information on political groups, detracting from counterinsurgency efforts. While the development of an intelligence course was a major step in providing appropriate training, qualified intelligence personnel remain scarce. There are no intelligence operations in the air force or the navy. Furthermore, communications are inadequate to support the needs of the intelligence community.

11. Strategy and Tactics (U)

(U) Salvadoran military strategy has undergone a major transition in the last 15 years, reflecting a change in the perceived national threat. The predominant concern of El Salvador in the 1960s was the increased tensions that developed between Honduras and El Salvador culminating in the Soccer War of 1969. For some time after the hostilities abated, both Honduras and El Salvador feared another confrontation; this atmosphere resulted in a heavy buildup of troops along their mutual border. The preoccupation with the Honduran threat continued until the signing of a peace treaty in 1980.

(U) As relations between Honduras and El Salvador improved, concern over the increasing domestic insurgency prompted the Salvadoran Armed Forces to reconsider its strategic goals. The 1979 Sandinista victory in Nicaragua created the perception of an immediate military threat to El Salvador. The Sandinistas were also viewed as potential allies of Salvadoran guerrillas. As violence escalated, the Salvadoran military attempted to develop a counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy, however, has yet to be fully understood or implemented despite assistance by the United States. A major problem is the tendency to react to guerrilla initiatives rather than take an offensive posture. (For further discussion of insurgent groups see AIS-El Salvador, Volume I, Chapter 4.)

(~~C~~/NOFORN) Using standard envelopement tactics, the Salvadoran armed forces regularly employ sweep actions to locate and destroy guerrilla strongholds. Mountain positions present particularly difficult problems. Multi-company operations usually attempt to encircle the base and sweep upward, utilizing reserve and blocking companies at the rear. The terrain involved often hinders tactical effectiveness, allowing guerrillas to escape the surrounding force. In many cases, one or two companies are left behind to continue the search for insurgent forces and to discourage the return of the guerrillas. Due to insufficient numbers of personnel, permanent deployment of troops in cleared areas is impossible. The shortage of personnel is a significant problem nationwide. Tactical deployment often must be structured to accommodate limited troop availability. Operations designed to employ large formations are often undertaken by smaller units. Guerrilla "hit and run" attacks against isolated installations and towns cannot be dealt with effectively due to a lack of personnel.

(~~C/NOFORN~~) The "Hammer/Anvil" tactical maneuver is regularly utilized. In this maneuver, a line is drawn dissecting an area heavily infiltrated by insurgents and a section lightly infiltrated by insurgents. Blocking forces are then deployed along this line. With the aid of artillery and air support, a battalion-size force sweeps into the heavily infiltrated area along this parallel line pushing the guerrillas away from the central area of occupation. Smaller forces, with air support, simultaneously conduct a search and sweep in the opposite direction eventually occupying the central area of infiltration.

(U) Small unit tactics have been the latest development in strategy by US training personnel. Conceptually, these tactics should turn guerrilla maneuvers against the guerrillas themselves. Small squads of government troops take the offensive against the insurgents. The small unit offensive tactical operation was successfully utilized against Che Guevara in Bolivia; it allows ground force units to react more quickly to guerrilla actions.

(~~C/NOFORN~~) Increased violent activity in urban areas throughout the country has forced the National Police and army to regularly patrol the larger cities in search of guerrilla safehouses and weapons caches. Urban violence, however, continues to be a serious problem.

(~~C~~) The continued destruction caused by guerrillas throughout the country has forced the armed forces to adopt, strategically and tactically, a more defensive posture. As guerrilla tactics altered to focus on the national infrastructure, armed forces personnel have had to assume permanent defensive positions to secure vital targets. There is an insufficient number of troops even to defend military bases and major economic targets. This significantly hinders the Salvadoran Armed Forces' capability to mount sustained and effective operations against the guerrillas. As of mid-1982, it appears unlikely that either side is capable of gaining an outright military victory and that the war of attrition will continue.

NOTE: The reverse side of this page is blank.

CHAPTER 2

ARMY (U)

1. Mission and Strength (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Salvadoran Army is the country's senior military force. Responsible for both national defense and internal security, the army focuses primarily on countering insurgent activities. In 1981, the ground forces were augmented to increase counterguerrilla efforts. The army has fluctuated in size over recent years and stands at 13,000 in 1981 with 600 officers. There are efforts underway to retain enlisted men for longer periods of time and to enhance recruiting.

2. Tactical Organization (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ El Salvador is officially divided into six military zones, each of which encompasses one or more of the political departments (see Figure 15). Each zone is designated a brigade, with the zone commander also serving as brigade commander. One or more battalions is assigned to each zone. Each battalion, in turn, has three to six companies subordinate to the battalion commander. Additionally, military detachments and training centers, often referred to as battalions, perform combat functions. All zone commanders formally report to the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), which includes the Commander of the Army. The General Staff, in turn, reports to the Minister of Defense. Thus, control of ground forces officially occurs through the zone system (see Table 2).

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The actual command structure, however, differs substantially from the formal structure. Each of the country's fourteen political departments is individually responsible for its own defense and does not rely on the formal military zone structure. Departmental commanders are the military leaders in the field and report directly to the AFGS, bypassing the zone which encompasses their department. Any military engagement that requires the forces of more than one department is coordinated at the General Staff level.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The AFGS is subordinate to the Minister of Defense. Through this structure, effective control over all elements of the ground forces is in the hands of the Minister of Defense. The resulting military structure, while giving departmental commanders a degree of autonomy, also gives the AFGS and the Minister of Defense a centralized command network.

~~(S)~~ The functional structure presents problems in organizing operations. Often, the brigade commanders initiate operations without prior coordination from the AFGS. Without this coordination, tactical support, logistics, and intelligence functions lapse behind the combat operations, causing unnecessary casualties and equipment loss.

3. Major Units and Disposition (U)

~~(C)~~ All military units including combat, artillery, and support services are integrated under the Ministry of Defense, but function as independent commands.

Table 2. (U) Ground Force Organization



SECRET

a. Military Zone Commands (U)

(1) Military Zone 1 (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ The Departments of Cuscatlan, San Salvador, and La Libertad comprise Military Zone 1 (see Figure 15). The First Infantry Brigade, the zone command, is located at San Carlos Training Center in San Salvador. This brigade, with 1,000 personnel in four rifle companies, a headquarters and service company, and a combat support company, is also the departmental command for San Salvador. Military Detachment 5, in Cojutepeque, is the departmental command for Cuscatlan. It consists of only two rifle companies and a communications squad totalling 250 personnel. The Department of La Libertad contains the Artillery Brigade in San Juan Opico, and both the Cavalry Regiment and the Atlacatl Immediate Reaction Battalion at Sitio del Nino. For organizational purposes, these commands are considered either Support or Reserve positions.

(2) Military Zone 2 (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ Three department commands are subordinate to Military Zone 2 (see Figure 15): the Second Infantry Brigade (zone command) at Santa Ana Army Headquarters, Military Detachment 6 at Sonsonate Army Headquarters Barracks, and Military Detachment 7 at Ahuachapan Headquarters. The first two commands each have four rifle companies, a combat support company, and a headquarters and services company containing 900 troops. Military Detachment 7 is about half this size, with two rifle companies, a combat support company, and a small communications squad.

(3) Military Zone 3 (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ The Third Military Zone, headquartered at San Miguel, is a unique command in that it supports its regional departmental commands (see Figure 15). The San Miguel Headquarters is equipped with a tactical operations center responsible for monitoring area intelligence and counterinsurgency operations. The Third Infantry Brigade contains 1,000 personnel, in three rifle companies, a combat support company, and a headquarters and service company (see Table 3). Aside from its departmental responsibilities, this brigade has served informally as a strategic reserve for much of the country, including the Departments of Cuscatlan, Morazan, and San Vicente. The departmental command for Usulutan is Military Detachment 4. The detachment contains four rifle companies and a combat support company composed of 550 personnel. This zone is a high-threat area; Military Detachment 4, however, is reportedly not well disciplined and lacks offensive initiative.

(4) Military Zone 4 (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ The Fourth Military Zone consists of the Departments of Chalatenango and Cabanas (see Figure 15). The Fourth Infantry Brigade is the zone command as well as the departmental command for Chalatenango and is headquartered at El Paraiso. This brigade has five rifle companies and a communications section totalling 800 personnel. Military Detachment 1,

Table 3. (U) Third Infantry Brigade Organization



~~SECRET~~

headquartered in Chalatenango, patrols that department with the Fourth Infantry Brigade; it is, however, considered equivalent to a department command and reports to the Armed Forces General Staff. Some 450 personnel are assigned to three rifle companies and a communications section. Military Detachment 2, located at Sensuntepeque, is the department command for Cabanas. It is composed of 300 personnel, three rifle companies and a communications section. It is considered to be an exemplary unit.

(5) Military Zone 5 (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ The Fifth Military Zone encompasses the Departments of La Paz and San Vicente (see Figure 15). Within this zone are two department commands: the Engineer Instruction Center at Zacatecoluca and the Fifth Infantry Brigade at San Vicente. The Fifth Infantry Brigade, the zone command, and a brigade combat support company has 500 soldiers and contains one battalion with three rifle companies and a communications section. Approximately 500 personnel are also stationed with the combat engineering companies and a communications section at the Engineering Instruction Center. All combat engineering companies have effectively become combat infantry units.

(6) Military Zone 6 (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Sixth Military Zone is the most recent addition to the zone structure (see Figure 15). Formerly part of the Third Military Zone, it encompasses the Departments of Morazan and La Union, with the headquarters located at San Francisco Gotera. The Sixth Infantry Brigade, the zone command, contains six companies. Morazan is a department with major insurgent activity, and the Sixth Brigade has consequently been forced into a defensive posture. Most troops are deployed in a static position reinforcing numerous towns in expectation of guerrilla attacks. Military Detachment 3 is the departmental command for La Union and consists of three rifle companies totalling 400 troops. Morale has been a major problem in this battalion, with 10 to 15 percent (%) of the troops reportedly leaving the ranks. Numerous allegations of corruption further distract Military Detachment 3 from performing at its best.

b. Combat Support Units (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ There are two functional commands that are referred to as Support Units, but retain the full status of a departmental command. The Artillery Brigade, which is located at San Juan Opico, contains 925 soldiers and officers assigned to seven artillery batteries and one headquarters and services battery (see Figure 15). The Brigade also functions as a support group for ground forces field units. The Signal Instruction Center at El Zapote Army Barracks is a 500 man combat force. This force is utilized as an infantry unit instead of a specialized training center. The Signal Instruction Center is regularly utilized in defense of the capital.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ As support units, these two commands cannot carry out their designated role. They lack the mobility to support infantry operations nationwide, particularly over an extended period of time or with limited warning. Each department, therefore, generally remains responsible for its own defense.

c. Strategic Reserve (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Three major commands constitute the Salvadoran Strategic Reserve: the Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Atlacatl Immediate Reaction Battalion, and the Airborne Infantry Battalion.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ The Armored Cavalry Regiment at Sitio del Nino totals 500 troops and four squadrons organized into the following functional areas: tank, mechanized, reconnaissance, and combat support. There are two smaller units responsible for services and communications (see Figure 15).

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Atlacatl Immediate Reaction Battalion, also headquartered at Sitio del Nino, is composed of 1,000 personnel organized into a headquarters and service company, a combat support unit, a mechanized reconnaissance squadron, and four rifle companies. Each soldier is armed with an M-16 rifle. The Atlacatl Battalion has received US training and equipment; it maintains a program to train new recruits and to refresh more experienced officers.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ The Airborne Infantry Battalion is located at Ilopango Air Force Base. Primarily responsible for air base security, it also functions as a nominal reserve force for the nation. The Battalion consists of three airborne squadrons totalling 400 personnel and a quick reaction unit which is on 24-hour alert. Weapons, machinery, and wheeled vehicles (including jeeps) are in relatively good condition. The Airborne Infantry Battalion is one of the best trained military units in the

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 5. (U) Panhard Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle

armed forces, capable of defending against small unit tactics, although larger and more sustained attacks could probably not be repelled.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ None of these three units is considered effective reserve components. These units lack the necessary organic mobility to accomplish this task and are primarily occupied with counterinsurgency efforts within their respective departments.

(U) Two other immediate reaction forces completed training in May 1982. The Atonal Battalion was trained at El Paraiso and the Ramon Belloso Battalion was trained at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. These two battalions were immediately utilized in both combat and training functions.

d. Other Units (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ There are eight other non-combat ground forces that report directly to the Armed Forces General Staff, all are located in San Salvador. The following units comprise these commands with their respective strengths: the Telecommunications Command (502), Military Police (200), Military Academy (13), Medical Company (105), Military Hospital (22), National Maintenance Shop (9), and the Armed Forces Instruction Center (6).

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Theoretically, the Commando Instruction Center and Engineer Instruction Center report through the Armed Forces Instruction Center. Operationally, however, these two commands report directly to the Ministry of Defense. This is also true for the Signal Instruction Company, which is designed to report to the Telecommunications Command, but, in fact, is a designated combat command.



UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 6. (U) Military Hospital in San Salvador

e. Weapons and Equipment (U)

~~(C)~~ Weapons for the Salvadoran ground forces include a mixed inventory of mortars, grenade launchers, machineguns, and rifles (see also AIS-El Salvador, Volume III, Part 2). The Salvadoran arsenal includes weapons manufactured in a number of countries, including the US, France, Spain, Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, and Czechoslovakia.

~~(C)~~ Combat units are equipped with 260 mortars of mixed sizes (120 mm, 81 mm, 60 mm). There are 96 M-60 machineguns, 300 M-79 grenade launchers, 22 3.5 inch rocket launchers, and 114 2.68 inch rocket launchers.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ A variety of rifles make up the army's arsenal. The most common include the G-3, 7.62 mm, and the M-1 and M-16. There are also 57 mm and 90 mm recoilless rifles. Many of the weapons are in disrepair, and are often unserviceable.

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 7. (U) 57 mm Recoilless Rifle

~~(C)~~ The Artillery Brigade's standard arsenal includes 47 20 mm Yugoslav air defense guns, 22 M-56 and 22 M-2A3 105 mm howitzers.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Standard wheeled vehicles come in multiple makes and sizes (½ ton, 3/4 ton, 2½ ton, 5 ton, and 8 ton). Substandard logistical and maintenance capabilities have resulted in many inoperable vehicles. The few available ambulances are located at various commands including the Fifth Infantry Brigade, the Artillery Brigade, and the Engineer Instruction Company. There are 10 armored personnel carriers (APC) imported from West Germany and 21 APC manufactured locally. The Engineer Instruction Company is equipped with three bulldozers, three bucket loaders, one crane, three scrapers, and two posthole diggers. Although some of this equipment has been modified for combat, most is inoperable, including the crane.

4. Training (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Salvadoran Army, as the senior military force, operates the majority of military schools and training programs. All programs are designed to enhance officer and enlisted personnel capabilities to provide a well-trained military staff adept in professional and technical services. All military educational programs have suffered due to the prolonged guerrilla conflict. In some cases, specialized schools and training programs have been closed, while others have been reduced in length and scope.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The army utilizes both educational programs administered by the Ministry of Defense, and programs administered by the army itself. Schools directed by the Ministry of Defense are open to all branches of the armed forces, with the army given priority due to the need for field officers and enlisted personnel.

a. Military Academy (U)

(U) The primary officer training center is the Captain-General Gerardo Barrios Military Academy (Escuela Militar Capitan-General Gerardo Barrios), located in San Salvador. Officer candidates are trained in general academic and military subjects leading to a commission as a second lieutenant (subteniente) in the army. Those graduates preferring duty in other branches of the armed forces are transferred after receiving their commission and given specialized training appropriate to their assignment.

(U) Admission is granted based on individual applications. Applicants must be between the ages of 16 and 21, and have completed four years of secondary education. Those selected for entrance must be physically fit and have passed the entrance examination.

~~(C)~~ About half the student's time is spent in the classroom, with the balance set aside for field activities. Cadets study the humanities and mathematics, as well as technical and military subjects, leading to a bachelor's degree and a commission. Emphasis is placed on history, geography, mathematics, and foreign languages. The normal length for completion is four years, but this has been reduced to three due to the scarcity of qualified officers in the field.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Faculty size fluctuates between 15 and 20, depending upon enrollment. Total enrollment is approximately 225, with about 100-125 cadets entering

and 25 graduating each year. During the first year of instruction 35% to 40% drop out. Foreign influence on the Academy has been considerable. While only three or four foreign students attend the school at any given time, foreign directors, especially Chileans, dominated the Academy throughout the first half of the twentieth century. German directors operated the school in 1938 and 1939, and US officers directed the Academy from 1941 to 1953. The director has been a Salvadoran since 1954.

b. Arms and Services School (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Advanced officer training begins at the General Manuel Arce Arms and Services School (Escuela de Armas y Servicios General Manuel Arce) in San Salvador. This school was designed to prepare officers for promotion to first lieutenant and for commissioning senior NCOs. Open to graduates of the Military Academy, as well as qualified NCOs and enlisted personnel, the school accepts students from all three military services. It specializes in training in basic and advanced infantry, basic field artillery, and in counterinsurgency techniques.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Senior NCOs can qualify for a commission as second lieutenant upon graduation from the School. However, as they are not Academy graduates, they rarely advance beyond the rank of major. Enlisted personnel enrolled in the program receive training in their unit, rather than at the school itself.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Faculty and instructors in this school are drawn from the Military Academy as well as from engineering, communications, and artillery units.

c. Command and General Staff School (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Advanced officer training is continued at the Manuel Enrique Araujo Command and General Staff School (Escuela de Comando y Estado Mayor Manuel Enrique Araujo) in San Salvador, founded in 1941 as the War College. Attendance at this school is necessary for promotion to colonel. Candidates for admission must have completed unit level courses and at a minimum have attained the rank of major. Approximately 20 to 25 students graduate each year.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The program is completed in two years, with the first year of instruction concentrating on general academic subjects, and the second year reserved for more specialized coursework in either academic subjects or military science. Since its inception, the Command and General Staff School has enjoyed an outstanding reputation in Latin America. A previous course graduated 10 Salvadoran officers in 1980. A course beginning in April 1982 has emphasized four basic functions: personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics. This course is primarily intended for field grade officers. Graduates receive the title of Diploma of the General Staff (Diplomado del Estado Mayor — DEM).

d. Other Schools (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ There are numerous service schools utilized in training recruits and draftees. Many of these schools have been sharply curtailed or closed.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Airborne Training School (Escuela de Paracaidistas), founded in 1973, is located on Ilopango Air Force Base. It trains army and air force personnel in

basic parachuting, rigging techniques, military free fall, and advanced parachuting (Jumpmasters School). Fifteen instructors train both officers and enlisted men who have been assigned to the program. Thirty to forty students may be trained at one time. Courses of instruction are based on the US school, with methods and techniques of instruction almost identical.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Command Instruction Center, now closed, was organized in 1976 to train officers and recruits in special small unit tactics. Located in San Francisco Gotera, ten instructors trained classes of about 100 in patrolling, mapping, survival skills, and hand-to-hand combat. The school was modeled after the US Army Ranger School. It was transformed into an infantry unit responsible for the defense of Morazan in response to insurgent activities.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Signal Instruction Center is located in San Salvador and responsible for training officers and enlisted men in communications. Basic communications, microwave operations, and other technical subjects are taught in courses of various lengths.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Recruit Instruction Center (Centro de Instruccion de Reclutas de la Fuerza Armada) was located in Sonsonate, west of San Salvador. The school prepared conscripts for military service and offered basic instruction in close order drill, weapons, and general military discipline in eight to ten week courses. Total enrollment varied with the needs of the armed forces. Due to the guerrilla activity, the Recruit Instruction Center was closed, with all training reverting back to the battalion level. Literacy and trade skills are taught at the small unit level, with specialized training restricted to men who reenlist.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Engineer Instruction Center at Zacatecoluca has been converted to a infantry unit responsible for patrolling and defending the Department of La Paz.

~~(S)~~ Although an apparent diversity of training programs are available to army personnel, there is still a severe shortage of trained and experienced NCOs and junior officers. Armed forces commanders have initiated new programs on a trial basis to alleviate this problem, but the time involved and constant turnover of NCOs will make long-term requirements difficult to meet. Foreign assistance, especially by the US, has been sought to increase leadership capabilities along with basic combat skills. Training such as that received at US Army bases should provide assistance in placing qualified military personnel in the field.

5. Logistics (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ Army logistics is directed by the D-IV of the General Staff in coordination with the Ministry of Defense. Individual commands are responsible for supply and storage of their weapons. Many commands have inadequate storage facilities which tend to be centralized, hence vulnerable to enemy attack.

~~(C)~~ The civil war which has engulfed El Salvador has put an inordinate strain on the logistics system. Shortages of manpower, equipment, and transportation disrupt methodical movement and resupply of field units. Prolonged engagement with guerrilla forces could be drastically curtailed due to the inefficient logistics network.

6. Communications (U)

(S) The Salvadoran army is linked to a nationwide single sideband (SSB) fixed radio network with other services of the armed forces. Local deployments of troops utilize PRC-77 radios that are often insufficient for operational requirements. A distinct lack of logistics and maintenance further hinders this situation. Ground forces are now capable of coordinating joint operations utilizing new communications systems installed in aircraft. Communications planning and security are virtually non-existent, but experience and military assistance may overcome these deficiencies.

(C/NOFORN) Insurgents have a communications network apparently superior to that of the armed forces. The Salvadoran ground forces do not coordinate frequency usage or utilize coded transmissions; the insurgents transmit in code and monitor armed forces communications. This results in the guerrillas' ability to pinpoint the location of government patrols and prepare for both offensive and defensive operations.

7. Capabilities (U)

(U) The Salvadoran army has not yet been able to halt insurgent activity. Although basic capabilities improved in 1982 due to a change in tactics and increased training from the US, guerrilla tactics have also improved.

(U) Guerrilla efforts are aimed at inflicting maximum casualties with minimum risk, destroying the economic infrastructure, and creating general domestic instability. Their ability to mount effective attacks was highlighted with the 1981 destruction of the Puente de Oro, a bridge connecting the eastern and western portions of the country, and with the 1982 destruction of numerous airplanes at Ilopango Military Airfield.



UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 8. (U) A UNIMOG APC During an Urban Counterguerrilla Operation

(C) Basic weaknesses within the ground forces have hindered the army from halting such guerrilla actions. A lack of personnel is a major deficiency. Most estimates place the government/guerrilla manpower ratio at a maximum of 5 to 1. Furthermore, field personnel are inadequately trained; many recruits are placed in combat after only a few weeks of training. Severe shortages of trained and experienced NCOs exist. Leadership training, when it can be obtained, remains inadequate. The lack of trained personnel extends to the officer corps; shortages of junior officers persist. The necessity of protecting major economic infrastructure greatly reduces the offensive capability of the army as troops are locked in static positions. Although soldiers attend Military Training Team sessions, officers often feel it beneath their dignity to accompany enlisted men. This results in confusion, as orders given by army officers often contradict Military Training Team instructions. Tactical errors have repeatedly proven costly to the armed forces.

(C) These deficiencies result in a minimal capability for sustaining prolonged offensive maneuvers. The alternative is to assume a defensive posture and patrol only specific areas. The Salvadoran Army has been moderately successful at coordinating sweep actions which incorporate units from many battalions. There also has been some success with small unit operations utilizing guerrilla tactics.

(C) Mobility is another crucial factor affecting operations. The mountainous terrain often hinders attempts by ground elements of the Salvadoran Armed Forces to directly engage the guerrillas. The inability to mobilize troops restricts logistical assistance, thus halting major campaigns before the objectives have been realized. Standard logistical problems associated with all branches of the armed forces also restrict effectiveness.

(C) The combination of a poor tactical intelligence network with the aforementioned logistical problems allows guerrilla groups to relocate before the army can arrive at the point of infiltration. In general, this is due to poor organization. This problem is further complicated by the poor military communications system employed by the army. Efforts to interdict arms shipments directed towards the insurgents have been ineffective, as ground forces are not capable of patrolling enough area to properly restrict arms shipments.

(U) Other deficiencies include poor morale, and inadequate discipline. Reports of insubordination have surfaced and morale is reportedly being harmed by continued guerrilla tactical successes. Infiltration appears to be an increasing problem, with the forced recruiting policy of the army allowing guerrilla sympathizers to gain entry into the army.

NOTE: The reverse side of this page is blank.

CHAPTER 3

NAVY (U)

1. Strength and Mission (U)

~~(C)~~ The Salvadoran National Navy (Marina Nacional Salvadorena) is a poorly equipped coastal force with only poor to moderate capabilities. Its primary mission is to interdict arms, personnel, and equipment that enter the country from the Gulf of Fonseca. Secondary tasks include maritime law enforcement, coastal surveillance, and coastal defense during times of war.

~~(C)~~ The Salvadoran navy consists of 335 enlisted men supervised by 17 officers. Another 100 full and part-time civilian technicians are also considered part of the navy. Vessels are constantly in various stages of disrepair, although most are listed as active. The majority are based at La Union in the Gulf of Fonseca with a token boat periodically based at Puerto El Triunfo (see Figure 15).

2. Organization (U)

~~(C)~~ The Salvadoran National Navy is organized as an autonomous and co-equal member of the armed forces, although it is politically and functionally the least influential branch of the military. The Commander of the Navy is located in San Salvador and reports to the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, who in turn reports to the Minister of Defense (see Table 4).

~~(C)~~ The four largest commands are designated captaincies, and include La Union, Puerto El Triunfo, La Libertad and Acajutla. La Union, situated on the Gulf of Fonseca, is the country's major naval base, housing the majority of active ships and the navy school. The commandant of this base directs all commands afloat. The three other captaincies perform a variety of naval functions. The only command not designated a captaincy is located at Suchitoto at the Cerron Grande Reservoir. The small crew at this command is responsible only for reporting safety violations.

3. Naval Ship Inventory (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Salvadoran navy's mission requirements exceed its operational capabilities. The current inventory needs constant repair; the hulls of many ships are in disrepair, and basic maintenance procedures are neglected. Maintenance and logistics deficiencies hinder operations more than any other factor (see Table 5).

a. Patrol Boats (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ Three Camcraft 100-ft patrol boats (PC) are stationed at La Union. Pennant numbers are GC-6, GC-7, and GC-8. Bought new in 1975 from the US, each is armed with one 12.7 mm/.50 caliber machinegun, one M-60 machinegun, one 20 mm cannon and one 81 mm mortar. Electronics onboard consist of one DECCA 914 radar, one Triton 55/75 VHS radio and one Collins KWM-2 transceiver.

Table 4. (U) Navy Organization



SECRET

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ These aluminum hulled vessels are driven by three General Motors 12-V-71-TI turbo diesels designed to achieve a maximum speed of 25 knots (kn), and displace 150 tons with a full load. The Camcraft have a length of 30.4 meters (m), a beam of 6.4 m, a draft of 1.5 m, and carry 10 crewmembers.



CONFIDENTIAL

Figure 9. (U) Patrol Boats at La Union

b. River/Roadstead Patrol Boats (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ The navy has eight patrol boats (PBR) suitable for estuarial navigation, all of which are located at La Union. There is one Sewart 65-ft, two USCG 40-ft utility, and six Outrage 25-ft craft.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ The single Sewart 65-ft patrol boat (GC-5) is powered by two General Motors 12-V-71-TI diesel engines, and displaces 35.7 tons at full load. The maximum sustained speed of this craft is 20 kn, 5 kn less than the maximum designed velocity. This boat will cruise for 600 nautical miles (nm) at full speed, but this may be extended to 1,360 nm at a speed of 17 knots. Armament consists of four machineguns. There are three 12.7 millimeter (mm)/.50 caliber guns and one M-60. Electronics include a DECCA 916 radar, a Triton 55/75 VHF radio, and a Collins KWM-2 Transceiver. The Sewart patrol boat carries 8.3 tons of reserve diesel fuel.

Table 5. (U) Naval Ship Inventory

Ship Type	Length (m)	No.	Name	Pennant No.
PBR	12.2	2	unknown	GC-3 GC-4
PBR	19.8	1	unknown	GC-5 (inoperable)
PBR	7.6	6	unknown	unknown
PB	30.5	3	unknown	GC-6 GC-7 GC-8

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ Two USCG 40-ft utility craft (GC-3 and GC-4) are based in La Union. They were commissioned in 1954 and 1951, respectively, and purchased by El Salvador in 1962. They are armed with three machineguns: two .50 caliber and one M-60. The hull is made of steel and the craft carries a crew of four. The two Detroit Diesel 371 engines propel the vessels to a maximum speed of 22 kn, allowing an operational distance of 253 nautical miles.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ The six Outrage 25-ft patrol craft were commissioned in 1981 and acquired by El Salvador in 1982. The boats were built by Boston Whaler. Each vessel is armed with two M-60s, and a single .50 caliber machinegun. Radar includes an unknown type of surface search radar. The twin 150 horsepower (hp) gas outboard engines power the craft to a maximum speed of 40 knots.

c. Miscellaneous Vessels (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ The Salvadoran Navy also operates smaller miscellaneous vessels. These include 5 "Zodiac" 40 hp boats and a single 18-ft boat. The latter was procured locally.

d. Overall Ship Capabilities (U)

~~(C)~~ Significant problems in the areas of maintenance, repair, and equipment make continued use of some patrol craft unsafe. Patrolling is limited and only emergency cases extend operations beyond the normal restrained level. There is a lack of firefighting equipment and a high potential for fires. Fuel leaks, bilges full of oil, and poor ventilation all create the danger of fire. Sufficient funds have not been allocated to remedy these shortcomings.



CONFIDENTIAL

Figure 10. (U) Two Outrage Patrol Craft at La Union

4. Naval Bases (U)

(U) There are four major port facilities on the Salvadoran coastline: La Union, Puerto El Triunfo, La Libertad, and Acajutla. The major naval station is located at La Union in the Gulf of Fonseca. (See Figure 15 and AIS-El Salvador, Volume II, Chapter 5, Ports.)

a. La Union (U)

~~(C)~~ The port of La Union is the Naval Base Command for the Salvadoran navy. The majority of ships are located here. It is located on the western shore of the Gulf of Fonseca and is the principal base for interdiction patrols. The only naval repair facility is also located at La Union.

b. Puerto El Triunfo (U)

~~(C)~~ Puerto El Triunfo is located in the Bahia de Jiquilisco southwest of Usulutan. One patrol boat is periodically deployed at this port, which has minor logistical services, but no repair facilities. This area is a major target for interdiction operations, although the patrol craft continue to be homeported in La Union.

c. La Libertad (U)

~~(C)~~ La Libertad is located 31 kilometers (km) south of the capital city of San Salvador. It is presently used for small (10-12 ft) fishing boats and does not have any automated loading facilities. The pier and berthing facilities are constructed of steel, concrete, and wood.

d. Acajutla (U)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Acajutla is located 81 km southwest of San Salvador. It has multiple berthing areas and automated loading facilities. It is the country's major commercial port with water depths ranging from 11 to 18.3 m alongside the single 338 m pier. There are no repair facilities.

5. Training (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Salvadoran National Navy depends heavily on foreign schools and training programs for specialized naval instruction. Much of the navy's deficiencies are due to the lack of a competent professional and technical staff.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Naval officers are recruited upon graduation from the Military Academy and given some specialized naval training. All advanced military schools including the Arms and Services School and the Command and General Staff School are open to naval officers. Officer training has included attendance at naval academies in the United States, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, and Ecuador. Refresher and advanced naval officer training has been received primarily at US schools in the Panama Canal Zone.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Initial conscript training is accomplished at the Navy School (Escuela de la Marina). Founded in 1978, the School is directed by the port captaincy at La Union. The Navy School, with a faculty of ten, prepares conscripts for basic sea duties by teaching elementary naval courses and rudimentary mechanics. On-the-job training is the primary training method for enlisted personnel; advanced training is minimal. The most highly trained enlisted personnel often leave the navy to take better-paying civilian positions.

6. Logistics (U)

~~(C)~~ Logistical support and maintenance are poor, hindering the navy in fulfilling its mission. There is an overall shortage of military repair capabilities, with all major work completed by civilian technicians at the port of La Union. Facilities are poorly equipped and most work is done with hand tools.

7. Communications (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Salvadoran navy's coastal surveillance and interdiction efforts are hindered by an inferior communications network. Radar capabilities are also inadequate, with most radar units often inoperable. Ship-to-shore communications, compatible with the army and air force communications systems, are limited. This situation improved with the arrival of the Outrage patrol craft.

8. Capabilities (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Although the Salvadoran navy has never been a very effective coastal patrol force, significant improvements were made in 1982. The most notable improvement was the acquisition of new patrol craft which have allowed an increased presence in the Gulf of Fonseca. Naval interdiction efforts have reportedly been a major factor in the decrease in arms, equipment and personnel infiltrations that occurred in the first six months of 1982. The navy has also altered patrolling procedures, emphasizing night operations and variance of patrol times.

~~(S)~~ Limited resources and the long coastline, however, hinder completion of many naval tasks. Limited funds and the navy's lack of political influence make significant improvements in naval capabilities unlikely in the foreseeable future. Many problems have only been partially remedied, including operations, tactics and intelligence. The US Military Training Team has recommended the creation of a 160-man marine unit to augment naval interdiction operations.

NOTE: The reverse side of this page is blank.

CHAPTER 4

AIR FORCE (U)

1. Mission and Strength (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Salvadoran Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Salvadorena — FAS) is composed of 800 personnel, 43 of whom are pilots. Eight officers are currently enrolled in a pilot training program. The air force has a complement of approximately 89 aircraft, all normally based at Ilopango Military Airfield (see Figure 15). Other personnel are involved with administration, security, maintenance, and related duties. There are approximately 40 civilian technicians, workers, and assistants with the air force.

(U) The mission of the Salvadoran Air Force is to defend the country against external aggression and to aid in the battle against the leftist insurgents operating within the country. The FAS provides tactical air support to ground troops, and performs air defense and border reconnaissance operations. The Salvadoran Air Force also participates in a variety of civic action projects and is responsible for transporting government employees.

2. Organization (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Salvadoran Air Force is organized as a co-equal service of the armed forces along with the army and navy. It is divided into four groups, with responsibility for personnel, combat, base security, and maintenance/logistics. These groups are subordinate to the commander of the air force (see Table 6).

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Personnel Group is the smallest section within the FAS and includes the Adjutants Office.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Combat Group is responsible for all of the country's military aircraft. There are four operational elements: transport, fighter/bomber, training, and helicopter.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Security Group consists of an air defense artillery battalion, one airborne infantry battalion, and a civil air patrol. The airborne infantry battalion, while technically a part of the Salvadoran army, is under the operational control of the commander of the air force.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Maintenance/Logistics Group consists of 360 officers and men, and includes a number of civilian technicians. It is responsible for supply, maintenance, and ground transportation. The Maintenance/Logistics Group includes the Maintenance Section, Supply and Transportation Section, and the Flightline and Base Maintenance Section.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ All aircraft are located at Ilopango Military Airfield, although some are temporarily based at other airfields. An air force reserve pilot proficiency program was initiated in late 1979. Approximately 12 former FAS pilots use the program to maintain proficiency in numerous types of aircraft.

Table 6. (U) Air Force Organization



~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~

3. Aircraft Inventory (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Salvadoran Air Force inventory includes various French, Israeli, and US aircraft, many of which are old and difficult to repair. All aircraft are functionally assigned to one of the four elements of the combat group.

(U) Guerrillas destroyed many FAS aircraft at Ilopango on 27 January 1982. This operation significantly reduced the number of operational aircraft, although some have been replaced.

a. Fighter/Bomber Element (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The fighter/bomber element consists of 22 aircraft: six Dassault MD-450 Ouragan jet fighters, six Aerospatiale CM-170 Fouga Magister jet trainers, 4 Cessna 02-A (337c), and six A-37B Dragonflies. Usually only four or five Ouragan and Magisters are operational at any time. Five Ouragan jets were lost during the attack at Ilopango Airfield. A lack of spare parts, constant use, and age cause continued major repair problems for the Ouragan fighters. Each aircraft is armed with four 20 millimeter (mm) cannon, with only two loaded during normal combat operations. Each is able to carry either two 500 pound (lb) bombs, or two napalm canisters. The jet trainers have 7.62 mm machineguns and carry two 150 lb bombs. The Ouragan can carry air-to-ground rockets. In 1979, maintenance problems escalated to the point where many pilots refused to fly the Ouragans unless they were adequately repaired.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The FAS acquired 12 aircraft in June 1982. These include four Cessna 0-2As (337c), six A-37B Dragonflies, and two C-123K Providers. The new aircraft, particularly the A-37s and Cessnas, are a key element in the air force's offensive against the insurgents. White phosphorus warheads were included with the Cessnas for marking targets.

~~(S)~~ The A-37s and the Cessna 0-2As have been integrated into the fighter/bomber element. The A-37s are armed with 7.67 mm machineguns and MK-82 500-lb bombs. Excellent accuracy ratings have been reported concerning the A-37 and the 0-2A pilots. This accuracy has greatly increased the FAS capability to successfully engage the insurgents.

b. Transport Element (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The FAS has five Douglas C-47 Skytrains, three of which are operational at any one time. Three were lost in the Ilopango raid. A lack of spare parts and the age of the C-47s hamper operational readiness; cannibalization of aircraft is a normal procedure. They are primarily utilized in airborne training and occasionally as a weapons platform in a close air support role. They can carry two .50 caliber machineguns. The two Douglas C-118s (DC-6B) have engine breakdown problems and are not armed. Only one is usually operational. When operable, they are used for intermediate range transport. The three Arava IAI-201 turboprops, used for short-range transport, carry three .50 caliber machineguns. Two are mounted on the fuselage facing forward, and are fired by the pilot. The three T-41D Mescaleros are also used for transport, but are rarely flown due to structural damage. There is a single Merlin III-B transport aircraft used as a diplomatic courier. On 30 June 1982, the Salvadoran Air Force received two C-123K Providers from the US to assist transport requirements.

Table 7. (U) Aircraft Inventory

AIRCRAFT	WEAPONS	POWER	NUMBER
Fighter/Bomber Element			
Dassault MD-450 Ouragan	Four 20mm cannon	jet	6
Aerospatiale CM-170 Magister	Two 7.62mm machineguns (MG)	jet	6
Cessna 02-A	MK-40 (2.75 inch) rockets	piston	4
A-37 Dragonfly	7.62mm MG, MK-82 bombs	jet	6
Transport Element			
Douglas C-47 Skytrain	Two .50 caliber MG	piston	5
Douglas C-118	None	piston	2
Arava IAI-201	Three .50 caliber MG	turbine	3
T-41D Mescalero	Unknown	piston	3
C-123K Provider	Unknown	piston	2
Merlin III-B	Unknown	turbine	1
Training Element			
Rallye Socata 235	None	piston	14
T-41A Mescalero	Unknown	piston	3
Helicopter Element			
Aerospatiale Alouette III	None	turbine	5
Aerospatiale SA-315 Lama	Four bomb racks	turbine	4
Hughes Model 500-D	None	turbine	5
Bell UH-1H Iroquois	Twin 7.62mm door guns	turbine	20
TOTAL			89

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~



CONFIDENTIAL

Figure 11. (U) C-47 Transports at Ilopango Military Airfield

c. Training Element (U)

(C/NOFORN) The 14 Rallye Socata 235s have no weapons; they are used solely for training purposes. Since the attack at Ilopango, only nine have been operational. The three Cessna T-41A Mescaleros have major maintenance problems; only one or two are normally operational. The FAS would like to replace them with newer training aircraft.

d. Helicopter Element (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The helicopter element consists of 5 Aerospatiale Alouette III turbines, 4 Aerospatiale SA-315B Lama turbines, 5 Hughes 500-Ds, and 20 Bell UH-1H Iroquois aircraft. All suffer from maintenance problems and combat-sustained damages. Acquiring spare parts for the French aircraft is particularly difficult. The Alouette IIIs are unarmed and frequently non-operational. Only one or two of the five Lamas is usually safe to fly. Domestically produced bomb racks have proven effective; they are interchangeable with the Lamas and can carry four 150-pound or two 500-pound bombs. The Hughes 500-D helicopters were originally mounted with .50 caliber machineguns, but these have been removed due to visible stress cracks. While Lama bomb racks will fit on these aircraft, the Hughes helicopters are generally used for reconnaissance and transporting airfield security forces. The Bell UH-1H Iroquois are generally used for airlift, but have operated as combat aircraft. They have sustained heavy combat damage; six were destroyed in the Ilopango Airfield raid. Six new UH-1H helicopters were received from the United States in February 1982. These aircraft are in constant use and require ongoing maintenance.

4. Air Facilities (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ There are two major air facilities in El Salvador: Ilopango Military Airfield located in eastern San Salvador, and El Salvador International Airport,

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 12. (U) Door Gunner on Helicopter During a Counterguerrilla Operation

approximately 35 kilometers south-southeast of that city. The completion of El Salvador International provided sufficient civilian facilities to allow the FAS to take full control of Ilopango. (See Figure 15 and AIS-El Salvador, Volume II, Chapter 5, Air Facilities.)

a. Ilopango Military Airfield (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The entire Salvadoran Air Force is stationed at Ilopango Military Airfield. Helicopters are occasionally stationed at alternate airfields in Santa Ana, San Francisco Gotera and San Miguel. All combat, transport, repair, and training facilities are located at Ilopango. Air force headquarters is located at Ilopango, as are the airborne battalion and the antiaircraft battery.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ Ilopango Airfield has a runway 2,234 meters (m) long and 45.3 m wide. This runway will accommodate up to 707 and C-141 size aircraft. A second asphalt runway in fair condition has a length of 1,600 meters. Facilities include a tower, approach control, Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range (VOR), air-to-ground radio, and a non-directional radio beacon (NDB). New hangar facilities for helicopters were built in 1980.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Air force support shops can service about 50 fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. The best equipped maintenance facilities, manned by well-trained

personnel, are the sheet metal, machine, and welding shops. The hydraulic, electrical, instrument, and communication shops are adequate, with the communications shop lacking technical manuals and test equipment.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ The FAS uses commercial jet A fuel stored in an underground facility with a capacity of 80,000 gallons. Fuel is transferred by trucks. The airfield has one fire station equipped with two fire trucks located near the flight-line maintenance area.

~~(C)~~ External security at Ilopango is provided by one airborne infantry battalion and an air defense artillery battalion. Attacks on the airfield, including the major attack in January 1982, prompted an increase in security measures. These measures include the construction of a new ten foot wall along the perimeter of the airfield, the doubling of security personnel at entrance gates and guard towers, the positioning of armored vehicles equipped with 20 mm cannon at the main gate, and the spreading of individual aircraft over the entire airfield to minimize possible losses during an attack.

b. El Salvador International Airport (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ El Salvador International Airport is the primary facility for civil air carriers. A new asphalt road has been completed from San Salvador to the airport, which is located south of the city. Facilities include VOR, NDB, and an instrument landing system allowing regular night operations.

~~(C)~~ Security at El Salvador International is directed by the National Port Authority and includes coordinating the efforts of the Customs Police and National Guard. Internal building security is controlled by unarmed police. The 120 Customs Police safeguard baggage, cargo, and runway access areas and the National Guard has sole responsibility for patrolling the airport perimeter.

c. Other Air Facilities (U)

~~(C)~~ There are over 100 usable airfields and one seaplane station in El Salvador. The Director for Civil Aviation estimates that a total of 72 known unimproved airfields exist for light aircraft; such fields are primarily used for crop dusting aircraft and for emergency landings. Many of these are also suspected drop points for smuggled arms entering the country by air. A single seaplane station is located on Lake Ilopango, but it is in poor condition and suitable for emergencies only.

5. Training (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The FAS participates in many training programs conducted by the Ministry of Defense and the army. The Salvadoran Air Force inaugurated its own pilot instruction program in May 1979.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ All officer training for the FAS is conducted at the Captain General Gerardo Barrios Military Academy. All graduates of this academy are commissioned second lieutenants and assigned to the army. All FAS personnel are volunteers, including officers assigned from active army duty. Specialized air force training follows graduation from the military academy.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Advanced officer training for FAS personnel is available at the General Manuel Jose Arce Arms and Services School and at the Manuel Enrique Araujo Command and General Staff School. This training is mandatory for promotion to colonel.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Until 1979, all flight training was received in the United States. The domestic flight course developed in 1979 was based on its US counterpart as were instruction manuals and course outlines. Designed to prepare officers as combat pilots, the program instructs eight to ten students for 12 to 15 months, graduating about five students each year. Candidates are generally first and second lieutenants, must be physically fit, and pass an entrance examination to be admitted into the program. All training takes place at Ilopango Airfield with 15 faculty members conducting classes and actual flight instruction.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Air force personnel also have access to instruction at the Airborne Training School (Escuela de Paracaidistas) at Ilopango Airfield. The school is administered by the army and graduates are assigned to the airborne battalion which is operationally subordinate to the air force. All pilots within the FAS are required to complete the 15-week course in basic parachuting and equipment care.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Support personnel are given on-the-job training. Selected NCOs attend advanced training courses based on their academic and job performance. The FAS is reported to be the most technically adept branch of the armed services. All volunteers must have sufficient English language skills to deal with technical manuals and formal instruction at US military bases.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ FAS helicopter mechanics are considered well-trained and work on both the airframes and engines. An increase in the UH-1H inventory, however, would tax available maintenance capabilities. In late 1981, ten personnel began training to qualify as UH-1H mechanics.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The establishment of the Reserve Pilot Proficiency Program has been designed to maintain pilot competancy in a number of different aircraft. The FAS requires that reserve pilots be capable of flying the Fouga CM-170 Magisters upon immediate notice. In 1981, the program expanded to include reserve proficiency in various other aircraft, with 12 former FAS pilots serving in this program. Civilian airline pilots could be mobilized within 24 hours. This was successfully done during the Soccer War in 1969.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Many trainees leave the FAS as soon as they have completed pilot or maintenance training. Most go to positions in the private sector which offer higher salaries and greater professional opportunity.

~~(C)~~ Foreign training facilities have been utilized in the past, with the US as the major instructor. While foreign training as a whole has decreased in recent years, pilots and maintenance personnel still receive some advanced training abroad. Israel has conducted Ouragan flight training classes for Salvadoran pilots.

6. Logistics (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The logistical support system of the FAS has suffered significantly as a result of the widespread insurgent activity. Major deficiencies include a dependence

on foreign equipment and maintenance training. The heterogeneous aircraft inventory creates further maintenance problems. The US has been a frequent supplier of aircraft. In the 1970s, Israel began selling numerous planes to the FAS. The various foreign equipment, combined with a resupply system that is slow and inadequate, hinders FAS logistics.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Much of the inventory of the FAS is antiquated and increased demands on aircraft in 1981 strained operational capability. Spare parts are often depleted, which results in the cannibalization of aircraft to maintain as many as possible in operational condition. The greatest concern for the FAS is the aging fixed-wing aircraft, specifically the Fouga CM-170 Magisters and Ouragan MD-450 fighters, which are often without spare parts. Numerous helicopters are often inoperable due to a lack of spare parts, combat damage, and a shortage of sophisticated equipment.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ FAS senior officers have attempted to alleviate the supply problem with purchases of foreign parts. The failure to establish systematic procedures for the acquisition of spare parts has severely hampered the military's ability to deal with the insurgents. There have been attempts to manufacture parts in El Salvador; however, such efforts have met with minimal success.



UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 13. (U) Helicopter Maintenance in San Salvador

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Maintenance is handled through the Maintenance Element. Although capable in certain areas, the Element appears to lack a systematic approach to maintenance. Phased maintenance was unfamiliar to the Salvadoran Air Force until 1982, and FAS Commanders have not insisted that present maintenance requirements be fulfilled; hence, attempts to establish advanced systematic maintenance systems have met with a certain amount of reluctance. The recent acquisition of new aircraft alleviated some logistical problems due to a two-year supply of spare parts which accompanied the aircraft.

7. Communications (U)

~~(S)~~ The Salvadoran Air Forces suffers from inadequate tactical and administrative communications. There is insufficient equipment for both field manuevers and training. The air force operates one communications station which connects to the army's nationwide HF/SSB fixed network. It also has its own internal network.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ There are commercial landline connections, including a teletype, between Ilopango Airfield and the Armed Forces General Staff Headquarters in San Salvador. Although maintenance is generally good, the communications maintenance facility at Santa Tecla cannot properly service all field equipment. The aircraft are equipped with VHF-AM transceivers. Some air-to-ground communications equipment was acquired in 1970. However, prior to 1982, there were few air-to-ground communications assets.

~~(S)~~ The arrival of A-37 and Cessna 0-2A aircraft marked a change in air-to-ground communications capabilities. The onboard communications systems are reportedly working well and are being utilized appropriately. Forward air controllers are using coded language to communicate with aircraft, the combat operations center, and ground forces. Capabilities for combined operations improved with the enhanced ability to communicate.

8. Capabilities (U)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The FAS has limited capabilities. It is restricted to fair-weather flying, a limitation due to a lack of equipment rather than training. The air force is also hampered by logistical deficiencies and obsolete aircraft. At best, the FAS could perform some limited defensive tasks.

a. Air Defense (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The FAS has a very limited air defense capability. Responsibility for this task rests primarily with the country's old and poorly maintained Ouragan jet fighters. While able to carry Israeli Shafrir air-to-air missiles, Ouragan maintenance problems have been so extensive as to either incapacitate them physically, or have pilots refuse to fly them.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Ground-based air defense consists of antiaircraft artillery located at Ilopango Airfield, La Union, and Acajutla. The antiaircraft artillery (AAA) crews have restricted abilities due to poor training. Abilities are particularly poor in the area of aircraft identification.

b. External Attack (U)

(C) The Ouragans provide a very limited external attack capability. Performance problems associated with these aircraft are severe and hinder the FAS in its external attack role. An additional FAS problem is the lack of adequately trained pilots.

c. Close Air Support (U)

(C/NOFORN) The FAS capability to conduct close air support operations is limited due to inadequate logistics and pilot training. Air strikes on guerrilla camps have been only marginally successful due to the relatively easy availability of caves and bunkers throughout much of the country. The UH-1H helicopters have performed relatively well in bombing missions. The Arava turboprop aircraft are armed with .50 caliber machineguns. Although generally used for short-range transport, it is also employed in a close air support role. The loss of a number of aircraft in the 1982 raid on Ilopango Airfield, however, temporarily restricted ground support by the air force. The acquisition of new aircraft from the US has improved FAS ability to support ground forces. Vital support has been adequately provided in some operations with the A-37 and Cessna aircraft.



CONFIDENTIAL

Figure 14. (U) ARAVA Aircraft With Rocket Pods and Machineguns

d. Tactical Airlift (U)

~~(S)~~ The FAS tactical airlift capabilities are conducted with the C-118s, C-47s, and Aravas, although the C-118s and C-47s are becoming more difficult to repair. While capable of air supply operations, troop deployment capability is limited to helicopters that shuttle troops from forward operation locations to areas of conflict. Return flights carry civilians and troops requiring medical evacuation. Tactical airlift was severely crippled with the loss of aircraft during the guerrilla raid at Ilopango Airfield. The new C-123K Providers have partially remedied this situation.

e. Air Infiltration (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Salvadoran Air Force has been unable to control the flow of arms into El Salvador. Air infiltration into El Salvador occurs throughout the country and consists of unidentified airplanes which make use of the country's numerous small airfields.

f. Search, Rescue, and Reconnaissance (U)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The FAS is capable of only very limited search, rescue, and reconnaissance tasks. Some civilian evacuation manuevers have been accomplished, and government officials use the FAS for transportation, but the widespread problems associated with the FAS hinder effective search and rescue capability. Reconnaissance is restricted to visual sightings and hand-held cameras. Three Arava turboprops are occasionally used in observation of ground forces. The T-41A and T-41D Mescalero aircraft are also utilized in an observation role. The Hughes 500-Ds are the primary reconnaissance aircraft.



CONFIDENTIAL / NOFORN

Figure 15

(U) Military Dispositions

(U) Military Dispositions

NOTE: The reverse side of this page is blank.

(U)

~~SECRET~~

CHAPTER 5

INTELLIGENCE GAPS (U)

1. Chapter 1, Defense Establishment (U)

a. Strength (U)

(U) What is the defense establishment's goal for size of all of the armed forces?

b. National Level Organization (U)

(U) How will the relationship between the new civilian government and the military be defined?

(C) Is the D-V continuing to function as a counterintelligence unit?

(U) Do the armed forces carry out any type of public works programs?

c. Logistics (U)

(U) Are there plans to fully integrate a logistics support network at the national level?

d. Foreign Aid/Sales (U)

(C) To what extent have the rapid deployment battalions improved their combat performance subsequent to their training in the United States?

(C) How well is the new battalion, trained by Venezuela, performing?

(C) Are there plans to have Venezuela train more battalions?

e. Communications (U)

(C) How effective is the integrated communications network of the four branches of the armed forces?

(C) How dependent on civilian communications networks is the military? Has the military resolved its jurisdictional dispute with ANTEL?

(U) What measures are being taken to remedy communications deficiencies?

f. Personnel Training (U)

(U) To what extent have guerrilla sympathizers infiltrated the armed forces?

(U) Why has a well-trained NCO corps not been fully developed?

(U) Will El Salvador be able to maintain a sufficient number of qualified personnel necessary for prolonged conflict?

g. Paramilitary (U)

~~(C)~~ Has the National Guard been reorganized into six zone commands?

(U) What specific role do the National Police and the Treasury Police play in the counterinsurgency campaign?

~~(C)~~ What has been done to control the human rights abuses of the Territorial Service?

h. Intelligence (U)

~~(C)~~ What is the actual role and function of the National Intelligence Service in the intelligence process?

~~(C)~~ Does the D-V conduct surveillance on civilian government personnel?

(U) How experienced are the interrogators at the battalion level?

~~(C)~~ What is the actual role and function of the Joint Operations Center?

~~(C)~~ How effective is the new AFGS Intelligence School?

(U) Is there any civilian oversight of military intelligence operations?

i. Strategy and Tactics (U)

(U) What battalion-level tactics other than sweep actions and hammer and anvil maneuvers are employed?

(U) How effective is coordination in multi-battalion operations?

(U) How successful are the newly instituted small unit tactics?

2. Chapter 2, Army (U)

a. Tactical Organization (U)

~~(C)~~ Why is the zone organization chain of command usually bypassed by military leaders when dealing with field commanders?

~~(C)~~ What is the advantage, if any, of the brigade system of organization when the largest fighting unit is a battalion?

b. Major Units and Disposition (U)

~~(C)~~ Why is the term military detachment used instead of battalion?

(U) Where are the Ramon Belloso and Atonal Immediate Reaction Battalions headquartered?

c. Training (U)

(U) Have the officer cadets trained by the US been effectively utilized?

d. Logistics (U)

(C) Given that poor logistical support has been identified as a major impediment to combat effectiveness, why has there been little apparent effort to improve the system?

(C) How do the individual battalions compensate for the poor national logistical support system?

e. Communications (U)

(U) What improvements are being made in tactical ground communications?

3. Chapter 3, Navy (U)

a. Naval Ship Inventory (U)

(U) What is the condition and combat readiness of individual boats in the Salvadoran navy?

(U) What recent inventory improvements/additions have been made? What has been the effectiveness of such improvements?

b. Naval Bases (U)

(U) What military facilities exist at Puerto El Triunfo, Acajutla, and La Libertad?

(U) How often are these facilities utilized?

c. Training (U)

(U) What specific subjects are covered in the naval school?

d. Logistics (U)

(U) What naval maintenance facilities exist and where are these facilities located?

(U) How does the naval logistical support system operate?

e. Communications (U)

(U) What are the ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore capabilities?

(U) What are the navy's radar capabilities?

f. Capabilities (U)

(U) What are the navy's actual offensive/defensive capabilities compared with regional naval forces?

(U) How successful are current interdiction efforts?

4. Chapter 4, Air Force (U)

a. Aircraft Inventory (U)

(U) What are current aircraft acquisition plans?

b. Air Facilities (U)

(U) Have security procedures been enhanced sufficiently to stop any further guerrilla attacks?

c. Training (U)

(U) How effective is flight instruction in El Salvador?

d. Logistics (U)

(U) What is the organization and capability of the air force's logistical support system?

(C) Why has phased maintenance not been adopted as standard procedure by the air force?

e. Communications (U)

(U) What type of equipment is used by the FAH?

(U) Do all aircraft have air-to-ground capabilities?

f. Capabilities (U)

(U) Does the FAH operate any type of early warning system?

(U) Have ground support operations proven effective?

Army Intelligence Survey entitled: "El Salvador - Volume III - Armed Forces." This report details the strength, history, training, logistics, capabilities, intelligence, and mission of El Salvador's defense establishment. Department Of Defense, 1 Sept. 1983. U.S. Declassified Documents Online, tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/4fcJM6. Accessed 8 Apr. 2017.