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SUBJ: CONTENT OF THE FOURTH BRIGADE'S DOCUMENT EXPRESSING
OPPOSITION TO THE MANNER IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS
HANDLING THE KIDNAPPING OF PRESIDENT DUARTE'S DAUGHTER

DOI: 10 - 11 OCTOBER 1985

SUMMARY: THE DOCUMENT WHICH FOURTH BRIGADE OFFICERS SIGNED ON 10 OCTOBER 1985 EXPRESSING OPPOSITION TO THE MANNER IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS HANDLING THE KIDNAPPING OF PRESIDENT DUARTE'S DAUGHTER WAS DRAFTED DURING A FOUR-HOUR MEETING CALLED BY MILITARY ZONE FOUR COMMANDER OCHOA. "AZMITIA" BATTALION COMMANDER FUENTES WAS THE PRINCIPAL DRAFTER. THE DOCUMENT EXPRESSES SPECIFIC CONCERNS OVER NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY MORALE. IT CARRIES THE SIGNATURE OF 24 OFFICERS; ONLY ONE OF THOSE WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING REFUSED TO SIGN. ON 11 OCTOBER, OCHOA PRESENTED THE DOCUMENT FIRST TO CHIEF, EMCFA, BLANDON, WHO ACCUSED OCHOA OF ATTEMPTING TO PUT HIM IN A COMPROMISING POSITION. OCHOA THEN TOOK THE DOCUMENT TO VICE MINISTER OF DEFENSE FLORES.

TEXT: 1. ON 10 OCTOBER 1985, COLONEL SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ, COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE MILITARY ZONE FOUR, CALLED A MEETING OF THE OFFICERS OF HIS FOURTH INFANTRY BRIGADE AT BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS IN EL PARAISO, CHALATENANGO. DURING THE MEETING, WHICH LASTED FROM 1000 TO 1400 HOURS, THE OFFICERS DRAFTED AND SIGNED A DOCUMENT EXPRESSING THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE NEGOTIATIONS CURRENTLY BEING CONDUCTED BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE RELEASE OF INES GUADALUPE ((DUARTE)) DURAN, KIDNAPPED DAUGHTER OF PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON ((DUARTE)).

2. THE DOCUMENT WAS WRITTEN PRINCIPALLY BY LIEUTENANT JOSE ((FUENTES)) RODAS, COMMANDER OF THE AZMITIA BATTALION, WITH INPUT FROM THE OTHER BRIGADE OFFICERS. THE DOCUMENT WAS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. THE FIRST PART, EXPRESSES THE PERCEPTIONS AND CONCERNS OF THE OFFICERS. THE SECOND PART IS A LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS.

3. THE PERCEPTIONS AND CONCERNS OF THE OFFICERS, AS EXPRESSED IN THE DOCUMENT, ARE:

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A. THE MANNER IN WHICH PRESIDENT DUARTE'S GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM ENDANGERS NATIONAL SECURITY BECAUSE IT ENTAILS NEGOTIATING ON THE INSURGENTS' TERMS, WHICH IS UNACCEPTABLE.

B. THE ARMED FORCES PRINCIPAL MISSION IS TO SAFEGUARD THE NATIONAL SECURITY, YET THEY HAVE NOT BEEN CONSULTED WITH REGARD TO SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM.

C. THE ARMED FORCES STRESS THEIR CONVICTION OF LOYALTY TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS BUT UNDERScore THE DANGER TO THE MORALE OF AN INSTITUTION WHICH IS SHEDDING ITS BLOOD IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT.

D. THE ARMED FORCES BELIEVES, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THAT THE SECURITY OF THE NATION MUST COME BEFORE THE HUMAN SENTIMENT OF ONE FATHER. NEGOTIATING WITH THE ENEMY ENDANGERS THE SECURITY OF THE NATION; THE PRICE IS TOO HIGH AND IT IS UNFAIR TO BE OBLIGATED TO PAY SUCH A PRICE FOR THE FREEDOM OF ONE CITIZEN.

4. THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS CONTAINED IN THE DOCUMENT ARE:

A. DO NOT CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE THE FREEDOM OF ONE CITIZEN IN EXCHANGE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE NATION.

B. THE HIGH COMMAND SHOULD EXPLAIN TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES THE REAL SEQUENCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE.

C. THESE CONCEPTS ARE NOT MOTIVATED BY PARTISAN INTERESTS.

D. THE ARMED FORCES ARE CONCERNED OVER DIVISIVENESS OCCASIONED BY PARTISAN INTERESTS.

E. THE HIGH COMMAND SHOULD RECALL THAT THOUSANDS OF MILITARY FAMILIES ARE IN MOURNING AND HUNDREDS OF SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN MUTILIATED IN COMBAT AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS. PARTISAN ATTITUDES UNDERMINE THE SACRIFICES OF EL SALVADOR'S MARTYRS AND HEROES.

F. THE RELEASE OF ONE OR MORE TERRORISTS LOWERS THE MORALE OF SALVADORAN SOLDIERS AND WILL CREATE A LACK OF TRUST AT ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND.

5. DURING THE FOUR-HOUR MEETING, NONE OF THE OFFICERS WAS ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE CONFERENCE ROOM UNTIL THE COMPLETED DOCUMENT WAS SIGNED BY THE ATTENDING OFFICERS. BRIGADE CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE (S-2) MAJOR OSCAR EDGARDO ((VELASQUEZ)) RIVERA WAS AMONG THE MOST VOCAL ADVOCATES OF THE DOCUMENT AND BROWBEAT

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SOME OF THE MORE RELUCTANT SUBORDINATE OFFICERS INTO SIGNING IT. ALTHOUGH ALL OF THE OFFICERS PRESENT WERE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE POINTS MADE IN THE DOCUMENT, SOME WERE RELUCTANT TO SIGN. IN THE END, ALL BUT ONE OF THE ATTENDING OFFICERS SIGNED THE DOCUMENT.

6. ON 11 OCTOBER, OCHOA PRESENTED THE DOCUMENT FIRST TO CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES JOINT GENERAL STAFF (EMCFA) GENERAL ADOLFO ONECIFERO ((BLANDON)), WHO ACCUSED OCHOA OF TRYING TO PUT HIM IN A COMPROMISING POSITION. OCHOA CONSEQUENTLY TOOK THE DOCUMENT BACK FROM BLANDON AND DELIVERED IT TO VICE MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL RAFAEL ((FLORES)) LIMA.

7. FOURTH BRIGADE OFFICERS WHO HAD SIGNED THE DOCUMENT WERE:

COLONEL OCHOA
LT. COLONEL BENJAMIN ELADIO ((CANJURA)) ALVAYERO, EXECUTIVE OFFICER
MAJOR VELASQUEZ, S-2
MAJOR FELIX RANULFO ((RAMIREZ)) GONZALEZ, PAYMASTER
MAJOR ALFREDO ((GONZALEZ)) BRITO, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS (S-3)
CAPTAIN DAVID ERNESTO ((NAVAS)) TENORIO, "COBRA" BATTALION COMMANDER
CAPTAIN FRANCISCO ANTONIO ((VILLACORTA)), CHIEF OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (S-5)
LIEUTENANT FUENTES, "AZMITIA" BATTALION COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT ALBERTO ((CONTRERAS)) ROBLES, COMPANY COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT CRISTOBAL ((SORTO)) SANCHEZ, COMPANY COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT RENE ((VIERA)) TORRES, ASSISTANT LOGISTICS OFFICER (S-4)
SECOND LIEUTENANT JUAN CARLOS ((CLARAMOUNT)) VILLAFANE, RECONNAISSANCE SECTION COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT JOSE ANTONIO ((REYES)) ROJAS, COMPANY COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT MIGUEL ANGEL ((PEREZ)) ALFARO, CHIEF OF PERSONNEL (S-1)
SECOND LIEUTENANT JOSE MAURICIO ((ESCOTO)), COMPANY COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT ARMANDO ((QUINTANILLA)), CHIEF OF SECURITY
SECOND LIEUTENANT AGUSTIN ((FLORES)) MATA, ASSISTANT S-2
SECOND LIEUTENANT EDUARDO WILFREDO ((MOLINA)) TORRES, COMPANY COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT JOAQUIN ((GARCIA)) LANDOS, COMPANY COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT MANUEL JESUS ((BARQUERO)) ELIAS, COMPANY COMMANDER
SECOND LIEUTENANT MANUEL DE JESUS ((DOMINGUEZ)), COMPANY

